IR 116/IPS 216 Spring 2003
International Policy Studies Program/IR
Stanford University
Mon and Wed @ 11 am -12:30 pm, Encina West 208
Syllabus
Instructor: Nikolay V. Marinov
nikolay@stanford.edu
Office: Encina Central 422
Office hours: Tue & Wed 1-2 pm
650 724 2762
This course will examine how state leaders have used economic coercion to convince other state actors to comply with a set of demands. Economic statecraft covers a wide variety of policy options "between words and war": stronger than diplomatic suasion, yet less objectionable than the use of force.
Emphasis will be placed on understanding the conceptual and methodological issues involved in measuring the uses and outcomes of interstate coercion.
The main thrust of the course will be very much applied. A substantial portion of our attention will be turned to specific policy areas in which there is a high demand for intervention currently. These are (1) democratization and regime change, (2) stopping and preventing civil wars, (3) containing rogue states, (4) protecting intellectual property rights and (5) defending system of free trade around the world.
The course will be taught in seminar format.
Assignments:
Students will be asked to write two short memos (2 pages) critiquing aspects of our understanding of the problem of intervention. The topics of the critical memos will be assigned one week before their due dates. The main assignment for the course will be a research paper proposal (limit 5 pages), leading to a research paper (20 pages). See the time-line below for due dates. *Format of the submissions: double-spaced, 12-pt font, with a bibliography appearing in the end. All assignments will be due at start of class on their due date.
Grading:
20 % in-class participation, 20 % for the two critical memos, 20 % for the research proposal, 40 % final paper.
Required texts available at the Bookstore*
Badwin, David. Economic Statecraft.
Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict.
*Note: All other reading materials will be available online through the course website
Course Timeline:
Wed, April 2
Introduction
(no reading)
Between Words and Wars: A Brief History, The Theory of Sanctions and the Current Conventional Wisdom
Mon, April 7
Beeston, Richard, "Mugabe faces new sanction after snub to leaders",
The Times of London, Sept. 23, 2002 
Wallensteen, Peter. 2000. "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited".
Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 1
Baldwin, Economic Statecraft.
Wed, April 9
Baldwin, David. 2000. "Success and Failure in Foreign Policy", Annual
Review of Political Science, 3:167-82
Schelling, Thomas. "The Diplomacy of Violence" in Arms and Influence
(1966)
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.
Recommended:
Hirschman, Albert. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade.
Berkeley, California: University of California.
Mon, April 14
Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey Shott and Ann Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. pp.
1-122
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis and Benjamin Radcliff. 1997. "On the
Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis."
American Journal of Political Science 41:608-618
Recommended:
Elliott, Kimberly and Peter Uimonen. 1993. "The Effectiveness of Economic
Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq." Japan and the World
Economy 5:403-409
Wed, April 16
Lindsay, James M. 1986. "Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination."
International Studies Quarterly 30:153-173
Pape, Robert. 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International
Security 22:90-136
Recommended:
Galtung, Johan. 1967. "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions
with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia." World Politics 19:378-416
Rowe, David. 2001. Manipulating the Market: Understanding Economic Sanctions,
Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan
Focus on Policy Issues: Democracy and Regime Change
Mon, April 21
Short memo #2 due:
``Baldwin (2000) presents a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of foreign policy tools, including economic sanctions. Discuss some ways in which Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott's (1990) empirical study conforms with Baldwin's ideas, and some ways in which it appears to ignore his advice.''
Hint: your memo should emphasize conceptual issues but it should at least refer to some empirical examples.
(This piece is now recommended only: Hanlon,
Joseph. 1990. "Successes and Future Prospects of Sanctions against South
Africa" Review of African Political Economy, 47:84-96
Levy, PI. 1999. "Sanctions on South Africa: What did They Do?", in
American Economic Review, vol.89, no. 2
Gleijeses, Piero. 1983. "The Case for Power Sharing in El-Salvador".
Foreign Affairs 61:1048-1063
Tomasevski, Katarina. 2000. "Donor's Reorientation to Democracy" in
Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and Their Human Rights Performance.
pp. 157-181
Recommended:
McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation through
Agent-specific Punishments." International Organization 54:809-24
Focus on Policy Issues: Civil Wars
Wed, April 23
McHugh. 2001. "US Aid and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany?" in: Esman
and Herring, Carrots, Sticks and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development
Assistance, pp. 49-89
Regan, Patrick. 2000. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention
in Intrastate Confict. pp. 19-35 and pp. 65-99
Focus on Policy Issues: Aggressive Unilateralism
in U.S. Trade Policy
Mon, April 28
Alan O. Sykes. 1992. "Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: the Limited Case for Section 301". Law and Policy
in International Business 23: 263-330
Bayard, Thomas, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. 1994. Reciprocity and Retaliation
in U.S. Trade Policy. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
pp. 51-97
Focus on Policy Issues: Intellectual Property
Rights & Other Matters
Wed, April 30
This piece is now recommended only: Benedikte
Callan. 1998. Pirates on the High Seas: The United States and Global Intellectual
Property Rights. Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
Susan K. Sell. 1995. "Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in
the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice". International Organization
49: 315-349
Leonard J. Schoppa. 1999. "The Social Context in Coercive International
Bargaining". International Organization 53, 2, Spring 1999, pp.
307-342
Daniel W. Drezner. 2002. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion." Mimeo.
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago
Foreign Aid as an Instrument for Influence
Mon, May 5
Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. "Who
Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic Growth 5:33-63
Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. 1999. "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction."
World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, D.C.
Wed, May 7
Wang, T. Y. 1999. U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting:
An Analysis of Important Issues. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1):199-210
Tomasevski, Katarina. 2000. Between
Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and Their Human Rights Performance.
Chapters 2-4. pp. 17-95
NOTE CHANGE: Sislin, John. 1994. "Arms as
Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 38(4): 665-689
Recommended:
This piece is now recommended only:
Cohen, Stephen B. 1982. "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human
Rights Practices." American Journal of International Law 76:246-279
Sanctions and the Use of Force: Embargoes, Containment and Rogue States
Mon, May 12 (research proposal due:
NOTE CHANGE!)
Allen Cheng, "The United States of China: How business is moving Taipei
and Beijing together", July 6, 2001. Asiaweek.com
Kennan, George. 1947. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign
Affairs 25:567-582
Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. 1968. Western Economic Warfare: A Case-Study in Foreign
Economic Policy. Stockholm: Almkvist and Wiksell. pp. 1-12
Liberman, Peter. 1996. "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic
Gains." International Security 21:147-175
Wed, May 14
Litwak, Robert. 2000. "US Strategy toward Rogue States." In Rogue
States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War. Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. pp. 47-119
Litwak, Robert. 2000. "Iraq" In Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy.
pp. 159-197
Litwak, Robert. 2000. "Iran: A Revolutionary State Or Ready to Rejoin the
Family of Nations?" In Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy. pp.
159-197
Recommended:
Drezner, Daniel. 2000. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International
Relations. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University.
Sanctions and International Organizations
Mon, May 19
Drezner, Daniel. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement,
and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?" International
Organization 54:73-102
Lisa L. Martin. 1992. "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the
Falkland Islands Conflict". International Security 16:143-178
Michael Lipson. 2001. "Organizational Fields and International Regimes."
Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, Working Paper Series
#01-03. University of Pennsylvania
Wed, May 21
Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Sanctions
and Regional Security: The Crisis in West Africa." In Sanctions and
the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner
Slavi Tr. Slavov. 2002. "Is It All About Sanctions Busting: The Effects
of UN Sanctions on Neighbor Countries." Mimeo. Department of Economics,
Stanford University
Stephanides, J. "A Brief Overview of United Nations Applied Sanctions".
Proceedings from the 1st Interlaken Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions,
March 17-19, 1998 (http://www.smartsanctions.ch/)
The Current Agenda: Terror, Arms and Diamonds
Memo #2 due: Outside pressure has been used to promote democracy, end civil wars, open up markets and contain adversaries. In your opinion, has pressure in some of these areas been more successful than in others? Why? What does that tell us about its effectiveness?
Make sure that you include references to examples drawn from the readings for weeks April 21 - May 14.
Wed, May 28
Anthony, Ian and Jean Pascal Zanders. 1998. "Multilateral Security-Related
Export Controls." In SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament, and
International Security, 373-402. New York: Oxford University Press
Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Carrots and Sticks for Controlling
Terrorism." In Sanctions and the Search for Security
Mon, June 2
Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano and Mikael Eriksson, eds. 2003. "Making
Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy
Options." Results from the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted
Sanctions. Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Reform or Retreat: The Future
of UN Sanctions Policy." In Sanctions and the Search for Security
Wed, June 4
Wrap-up: Do Sanctions Work, or What Do We Know about This?
Reading TBA
Mon, June 9 (no class; research paper due)
Beyond this class: Want to know more?
The Stockholm Process on Smart Sanctions
Includes the most comprehensive and up-to-date sanctions bibliography one could
think of. Also, a ton of links to UN sanctions missions, weapons control regimes,
trade-related think-tanks like the Institute of International Economics in DC,
all on the frontiers of current sanctions applications and research.