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Civil Wars & Foreign Powers:
Outside Intervention in Intra-State
Conflict

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TWO

Descriptive Evidence on Conflicts and Interventions

This chapter serves two purposes. First it introduces the data that are used to examine some of the questions posed in the introductory chapter. Valid and reliable data are critical if we are to draw useful inferences about when interventions are likely and the conditions under which they will tend to be successful. And, second, we need a benchmark from which to judge our results. The data are of course central to the testing of hypotheses, without which the theoretical arguments will remain hunches. A common benchmark, on the other hand, gives us some way to judge the usefulness of the reported results. The benchmark can be thought of as a set of descriptive statistics that provides information about the characteristics of the conflicts, the strategies used for intervening, and the relative effectiveness of different strategies in various types of conflicts. This descriptive exploration employs simple bivariate statistics to paint a broad-stroked portrait of how interventions have been carried out and under what conditions they tend to succeed. But such a rudimentary form of investigation can at best serve as a prelude to a more systematic treatment to follow in the succeeding chapters.

To put this into perspective, the objective of this book is to develop a better understanding of the effect of various strategies for intervening under different conditions of conflict. Empirically testing hypotheses relating specific interventions to characteristics of the conflict will require models with multiple variables that can "control" for various concurrent causal effects. But it is also useful to know whether, in general, military interventions are more successful than the economic variety, or whether ethnic conflicts are more tractable than ideological ones. These types of questions are the focus of this chapter. One might think of this as the quintessential "holding all things constant," which most people realize is an extreme oversimplification of our sociopolitical world. But by going through this

exercise we learn about the data being used, which in turn facilitates our interpretation of a more complex modeling of the world.

What follows is a summary of the data used in this analysis, the sources consulted in the compilation of the data, and a discussion of the descriptive statistics that result from simple bivariate analysis. This chapter sets the stage for the next two chapters; it also serves as a space-saving device by obviating the need to engage in an in-depth description of data, coding procedures, and sources as each subsequent chapter unfolds.

Data Description

To test the ideas articulated throughout this book a comprehensive set of data on intrastate conflicts in the post-World War II period was generated. These data incorporate not only those internal conflicts in which there were outside intervenors but also those conflicts in which there were no interventions. The data record characteristics of the conflict, the combatants, and the intervention (if any), as well as the success or failure of the intervention. The completeness of the data in terms of the conflicts included can be checked against those intrastate conflicts identified by Licklider (1995), where, although generated completely independently and with no prior knowledge of each other's research efforts, one finds a near-total convergence on cases. In short, the data reflect the population of civil conflicts in the post-World War II period that meet the conditions outlined in the following section.

Case Selection

The data expand and refine some of the more comprehensive compilations of data on military interventions—in both inter- and intrastate conflicts (see Pearson and Baumann 1993; Small and Singer 1982; Tillerna 1989). I draw on each of these data sets extensively. The Small and Singer data adopt the convention of 1,000 fatalities for inclusion as a civil war; this casualty rate was relaxed for the data used in this analysis. Although civil wars may be the more visible and long lasting of the intrastate conflicts, a considerable number of civil conflicts clearly do not look like what we generally conceive of as a civil war. For example, the Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea, the Chiapas uprising in Mexico, or the religious conflicts in the northern states of India do not have the flavor of a “civil war” like that of El Salvador or Angola throughout the 1980s. However, these less intense conflicts can be a cause for concern among members of a regional or global community, lest they simmer and expand, leading to either the diffusion of the conflict or the need to address the human consequences of a protracted social upheaval, or both. An important question for this work is whether there is a thresh-

old in the number of fatalities above which third parties intervene and, if so, whether the number of casualties affects the success or failure of the intervention. These are empirical questions that can be answered with the data drawn from a less restrictive view of civil conflicts.

I define intrastate conflict as armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities. This lower threshold allows me to capture the seriousness of the conflict, yet it is high enough to exclude events such as “bloodless” coups, riots, and demonstrations. Two hundred fatalities conveys a sense that the demands of the opposition are such that the potential for further escalation is reasonably high.

Sources for these data included the Correlates of War Civil War database (Small and Singer 1982), the annual *Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Keatings Contemporary Archives*, the *New York Times*, the *Minorities at Risk Project*, the Military Intervention data generated by Herbert Tillerna (1991) and Pearson and Baumann (1993), and, where necessary, historical documents pertaining to a specific case. Temporally the cases span the period 1944 to 1994, starting with the Greek civil war. Pushing the analysis back to the first half of the twentieth century posed conceptual and methodological problems that were best resolved by abbreviating the period under study. Conceptually, so much of the civil conflict in the earlier part of the century could be tied to anticolonial struggles and therefore shifts the debate from intra- to international conflict (or what Small and Singer have labeled extrasystemic conflicts). Some of this carried over into the anticolonial movements in the post-World War II period, though these conflicts were not included in the population of cases used in this analysis. Methodologically, going back to the pre-1944 period made the search for reliable and valid data increasingly problematic, leading to an arbitrary point where the data might be reliable, and with a cutoff point having no theoretical or intuitive justification. Neglecting these difficulties in the case selection process could ultimately pose problems with subsequent interpretation. The most logical cutoff point, therefore, was the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war.

Characteristics of the Conflict

Characteristics of the conflicts and the combatants make up one set of explanatory variables that contribute to our understanding of when third-party interventions are more likely to be successful. A key ingredient in these outcomes is the identification of the orientation of the groups in conflict. For example, civil disputes fought over religious or ideological issues may be more tractable to outside interventions than those fought over ethnic divisions because of the ease with which identity can be assumed or discarded (Kaufmann 1996). This characteristic of the conflict has implications for the political costs of intervening as well. If cross-

national ethnic affinity acts as a political factor in decisions over whether to intervene (Carmant and James 1995b), then understanding the extent to which this operates in the decision process is important. Accordingly, the ethnic, religious, or ideological orientations of the groups in conflict were identified and the conflict classified based on the orientation of the primary groups in conflict. The identification of groups was determined through the use of the Minorities at Risk classification scheme and the Correlates of War Cultural Data Set.¹ The first two groups (ethnic and religious) roughly correspond to what Gurr (1993) refers to as ethnonationalists, and militant sects. Ethnically based conflicts involve groups that identify with a distinct ethnic or cultural heritage; religious conflicts involve groups that are organized in defense of their religious beliefs. Ideological conflicts, on the other hand, involve groups contesting the dominant political or economic ideology, which can, but need not, incorporate an ethnic or religious dimension. Williams and Kofman (1989) use similar criteria to identify community conflict.

The threefold typology used here cannot provide mutually exclusive categories that sufficiently describe the complexity of many conflicts. This is a limitation, though not a crippling one. In most instances the orientation of the groups in conflict was fairly transparent, allowing for a somewhat straightforward identification. As is probably true with many civil conflicts, however, people often identify with more than one group. This would be particularly true in religious and ethnic conflicts, less so when the conflict is organized around ideological issues. The Bosnian conflict makes this point quite clearly. The ruling government of the Bosnian state generally identifies with Muslim religious faith; the Croats and the Serbs likewise identify with their respective Christian beliefs. But in each case there is also an identification with an ethnic grouping. Determining which is the most dominant orientation is not always easy, nor is the problem restricted to ethnic and religious conflicts. Ideology can also separate ethnically homogeneous groups, as one could argue it did in Zaire or Angola, though this poses less of a problem in terms of concurrent affiliations, where in most instances an ideological struggle brings together people of different ethnic, religious, and social backgrounds.

Although there is overlap, Gurr (1993) lists minority groups based on primary and secondary affiliations, and it is his primary orientation that is used to make the distinction between ethnic and religious conflicts in this analysis. One of the distinctions between religious and ethnic conflicts that makes this coding scheme germane is that the demand of the groups will often be at crosscurrents. For example, minority ethnic groups often suffer at the hands of a majority group by being cut out of political access and/or economic opportunities. Religious groups in

conflict, on the other hand, are often demanding the freedom to openly practice or advocate their spiritual beliefs. These distinctions, though somewhat cloudy in operational terms, are an important empirical dimension in a study of whether and how to intervene, as well as in the likely success of any interventionary policy. Kaufmann (1996), furthermore, argues that the tractability of civil conflict is directly related to the identity of the combatants, whereby certain types of identity patterns can be assumed or discarded more easily than others. Ethnic identity, for instance, is more difficult to discard than a religious or ideological identity; according to Kaufmann's argument, this makes the resolution of ethnic conflicts more difficult. Since ideological and religious identities can span the more physically traceable aspects of ethnicity, the ability to wage conflict, persecute participants, or separate combatants should vary across group orientation.

Other characteristics of the conflict that are important for understanding when to intervene and when interventions have an increased probability of success are (1) the strategic environment in which the conflict is being waged, including both cold war dynamics and the number of shared borders, (2) the existence of a humanitarian crisis associated with the conflict, (3) the number of fatalities, and (4) the intensity of the conflict. Fatalities not only denote an operational point for inclusion of cases but also reflect the seriousness of the social conflict and the extent to which it is entrenched in the society and visible to the global community. Sources for the number of casualties are generally the same as those for the conflict itself, including but not limited to the Correlates of War data, Tillemans's intervention data, the *New York Times*, *Keesings*, and the Pearson and Baumann data on military interventions. The intensity of the conflict is operationalized in terms of the number of fatalities per year averaged over the course of the conflict. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the intensity of the conflict should influence the decision over whether to intervene as well as affecting the likelihood that any intervention will be successful.

Conceptually, humanitarian issues involve concerns over famine, refugee flows, genocide, and ethnic expulsions, though some broaden this conception to include factors associated with poverty and underdevelopment (Väyrynen 1996). But linking mass social dislocations to a civil conflict is not always a simple task where, for instance, the humanitarian crisis could be the cause of the conflict rather than a consequence of it (Väyrynen 1996). Operationally I define a humanitarian crisis associated with a civil conflict in terms of the extent of refugee flows, either as internally displaced peoples or as international refugees. A conflict associated with the flow of at least 50,000 refugees is considered to be of a concern on humanitarian grounds and was coded 1; otherwise, zero. Data were derived from the annual report of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the *New York Times*, and specific case histories where necessary.

¹ The Correlates of War (COW) Cultural Data Set records ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups within countries, identifying each group's population and their percentage makeup of the total population of the country.

The cold war is considered to have ended as of January 1, 1989, for reasons that will be more fully outlined in the following chapter. Although it is risky to “peg” the date that the cold war ended, I do so at the beginning of 1989 with the change in the U.S. presidency from Ronald Reagan to George Bush. It is argued that the effect of the cold war was such that it influenced the incentives to be garnered from an intervention, and ultimately, one might argue, contributing to the shift in the pattern of interventions from unilateral to multilateral efforts. One effect of the cold war was to compel the decision-making community to view most conflicts in terms of zero-sum outcomes. The impact of moving away from zero-sum formulations of world events should serve to shift the calculations of expected payoffs from interventions. Finally, intervening in an ongoing civil conflict requires both an opportunity and a willingness to do so, and a direct route to the opportunity and willingness is through a shared border (Siverson and Starr 1991). A contiguous border is operationalized in terms of the Correlates of War definition of either a land border or less than 150 miles of water separating two otherwise contiguous countries. The number of countries contiguous to the country experiencing the civil strife is the indicator used in the analysis.

Characteristics of the Intervention

The other set of explanatory variables critical to our understanding of interventions and their outcomes is composed of the characteristics of the intervention, or in more policy-relevant terms, the strategy for intervening. The complex mix of factors that can comprise an intervention strategy ranges from punishments to rewards, incremental policies to massive onslaughts, supporting the government to supporting the opposition. For this analysis I simplify that range by focusing on two components of the strategy: the form of intervention and the intended target. What is left out in this simplification process deserves mention, so before moving on to a discussion of what is deemed most important, let me talk about those other components of an intervention strategy that will be deferred.

An intervention strategy can involve, for example, a mix of incentives and punishments, which might be used to induce or reinforce behavior, or to compel action. Whether one approach is more effective, and under what constellation of factors, is a question without many answers at this juncture. Furthermore, an intervention strategy can be implemented in an incremental fashion—slowly ratcheting up the incentives or punishments—or it can unfold in one massive swoop. The UN policy toward Iraq in 1991 is an example of the latter; the U.S. interventions in Nicaragua and El Salvador are examples of a more incremental process. At the end of the Gulf War when the Iraqi government began persecuting the Kurdish populations, the UN imposed swift and sweeping economic and military sanc-

tions on Iraq while restricting the ability of the Iraqi military to advance against the Kurds by imposing a no fly zone. In Nicaragua and El Salvador the United States gradually increased and decreased the amount of assistance given to the contra in Nicaragua or the government in El Salvador, hoping, it would seem, that each incremental change would be sufficient to compel the desired action.

Whether the speed or sequence with which an intervention takes place or the emphasis on rewards versus punishments affects the outcome, is an interesting and vital question, but one for which we lack sufficient theoretical understanding from which to identify empirical generalizations. For example, to specify a statistical model reflecting the role of time or the sequential unfolding of an intervention we have to have a reasonable grasp of how these two factors interact and contribute to the observed outcome. Negative (or positive) empirical results derived from a poorly specified model mean very little, just as a linear test of an underlying curvilinear process may show no systematic relationship, yet a more valid exponential specification may identify a strong relationship. Unfortunately, the current state of our understanding about the relationships among time, sequencing, and rewards and punishments leaves us unequipped to tease out potential causal mechanisms. But this does not leave us totally impoverished with regard to our ability to capture the intricacies of the intervention dilemma. It simply means that we have to postpone some of the questions and continue to rely on intuition and analogous comparisons in the decision-making process, at least until somebody takes up this further challenge.

Given these limitations and my operational definition of an intervention outlined in chapter 1, I focus on three generic forms of intervention (military, economic, and mixed), and two targets of the interventions (government and opposition). Military interventions encompass the supply or transfer of troops, hardware, intelligence, air or naval support, and logistical support to the parties in conflict or, as may be the case, the cutoff of any such aid currently in place. Economic interventions involve various forms of economic aid, and economic sanctions or embargoes. Mixed strategies are those that incorporate some combination of military and economic instruments. The critical point in each instance is that the military or economic behavior conforms to the convention-breaking and authority-targeted criteria outlined in the first chapter. Sources for data on interventions include those previously mentioned but also include country-specific case histories when necessary.

Keeping in mind the criteria of convention-breaking and authority-targeted activities for interventions, determining when an intervention has been attempted and whether it was successful can present difficult coding problems; two particular difficulties stand out. The first, and generally the more tractable, is determining when a particular intervention is directly linked to the conflict at hand. Often

this is a straightforward determination; at times it imposes quite difficult decisions. For example, arms transfers (to either the government or opposition) in the midst of armed conflict poses few difficulties. U.S. aid to UNITA or the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are cases in point. However, economic aid to a government fighting a guerrilla war presents a more difficult coding problem. El Salvador is a useful example. Would the United States have given economic aid in the absence of a serious challenge to the government? Maybe, but possibly in different amounts or combinations. My coding procedure looked for (1) any explicit linkages between aid decisions and the progression of the conflict and (2) any convention-breaking support that coincided with the initiation of or changes in the conflict.

The second coding problem is less tractable than the first and stems from an inherent difficulty in linking any particular intervention to the outcome of the fighting. Identifying successful interventions requires the linking of the intervention to at least a six-month respite from the fighting. Sometimes, again, this is relatively easy. In cases of military interventions it was often possible to make the necessary connection between the intervention and the outcome without much difficulty. The Dominican revolt stands out. Other forms of intervention at other points in time tend to have a more obscure relationship between cause and effect. In the coding process I tried to err on the side of caution, making it particularly difficult to achieve a successful intervention. The U.S. support for the Nicaraguan contra is useful here. Although large amounts of military and economic support were poured into the contra effort, it was difficult to directly link this support to the end of hostilities. The fighting eventually did end, but only after a Sandinista defeat at the ballot box. The U.S. intervention may have contributed to the electoral defeat of the Sandinista party, but it is difficult to make that determination from the data at hand.

A quite compelling argument can be made that who intervenes matters in the likely outcome of the intervention attempt. As will be made more explicit in chapter 4, major powers have far greater latitude over the potential range of intervention mechanisms than do minor powers; therefore, interventions by major powers should have a greater impact on the course of the conflict. In the realm of economic interventions major powers would have both more to offer and more to withhold than a minor power trying to influence the course of a conflict. Likewise militarily major powers would tend to have a greater range of alternatives and weigh in disproportionately on one side of the conflict. Major power status was operationalized in terms of the Correlates of War classification, with the indicator coded dichotomously identifying whether an intervenor was a major or minor power.

In spite of any shortcomings, the data described in the following present a remarkably comprehensive overview of those civil conflicts in the post-World War II period. We know who was fighting, how many casualties, whether there was a

large number of refugees as a result of the fighting, who intervened and how, and which interventions contributed to an end to the fighting. Collectively these factors help to account for when and under what conditions policies with regard to interventions will be carried out. We will start this process with simple, but important, bivariate statistics.

Descriptive Analysis

Based on the preceding criteria and sources, 138 intrastate conflicts were identified, of which 89 had at least one third-party intervention. Within these 89 conflicts there were a total of 194 individual interventions—with each intervention in a conflict coded separately on each dimension of the intervention itself. The individual coding of each intervention allows for the examination of the effect of multiple interventions into the same conflict, including those conflicts with interventions supporting competing groups in contention. Furthermore, I have data on 49 civil conflicts in which there were no outside intervenors. This control group allows me to examine the conditions under which interventions are more likely and then press the analysis further to explore the conditions for success once the decision to intervene has been taken, allowing me to explore the characteristics that led to the different policy choices.

Of the 138 intrastate conflicts identified in the postwar period, 34 of them were still ongoing as of 1994, 10 of which began as recently as 1992. When broken down into the year that the conflict started, it becomes clear that the 1960s ushered in an era more prone to the initiation of intrastate strife (see table 2.1); this is consistent

TABLE 2.1. Number of Conflict Initiations per Year

	1944	1	1950	2	1960	4	1970	4	1980	4	1990	4
1946	2	1953	1	1961	1	1971	4	1981	2	1991	7	
1947	2	1954	2	1962	3	1972	5	1982	4	1992	10	
1948	5	1956	2	1963	5	1973	1	1983	4	1993	2	
1949	1	1958	2	1964	1	1974	2	1984	3	1994	3	
		1959	2	1965	4	1975	6	1985	3			
				1966	2	1977	2	1986	3			
				1967	3	1978	6	1987	2			
				1968	2	1979	3	1988	3			
				1969	1			1989	3			
Totals	11		11		26		33		31			26

Note: Missing years are without conflict initiations.

with Gurr's findings (1994) and largely reflects the instability that came with the withering of the colonial system. The artificial borders created by the colonial powers—particularly across the African continent—and the ensuing power vacuums created when the colonial governments pulled out sparked an upsurge in internal conflicts. Furthermore, the apparent increased frequency of intrastate conflict in the 1990s does not yet constitute a clear change in the trend—at least as determined by comparing the difference in means between the 1980s and 1990s.² For example, if there were just two conflicts initiated each year for the subsequent five-year period of the 1990s, the total for this decade would be 36 conflicts, only three more than the total for the decade of the 1970s. However, events in the early part of the 1990s suggest that the cold war may have acted as a constraint on ethno-political strife, though it remains to be seen whether the trend toward increased civil conflict will continue. Africa and Asia are clearly the most conflict prone, accounting for approximately 34 percent and 25 percent of the conflicts, respectively; Europe accounted for only 9 percent of the conflicts, while figures for the Middle East and the Americas, respectively, are 18 percent and 14 percent.

In terms of intervenors, nearly 40 percent (76 cases) of all interventions were carried out by major powers, and the remainder were attributed to minor powers. The United States, with 35 interventions, accounts for by far the most instances of interventions, while the Soviet Union, or Russia, intervened 16 times. France and Britain were involved in ten and nine interventions, respectively (see table 2.2). Of the 190 cases of intervention only about 30 percent were coded as contributing to the stopping of the fighting. There were eight cases in which the UN intervened in civil conflicts, at times actively supporting one of the combatants, though these cases are excluded from the analysis. Examples where the UN intervened on behalf of one side in a civil conflict include the Congo crisis in 1963 and South Africa throughout the 1980s. Bosnia and Cyprus represent two instances where the UN intervened with a neutral orientation. A discussion of interventions that are neu-

TABLE 2.2. Most Frequent Intervening States, by Number of Interventions

United States	35
USSR/Russia	16
France	10
Britain	9
China	6
Cuba	5

² The difference in means between the 1980s and 1990s is 2.1 ± 2.2 at a 95% confidence interval.

tral and under the auspices of a multilateral organization will be taken up systematically in chapter 5.

When breaking down the success or failure of different intervention policies by the type of conflict and the target of the intervention attempt, we begin to get a sense of how past policies were implemented and how well they fared. These data suggest that interventions are about equally likely to be on behalf of the government as they are on the side of opposition forces, with 91 supporting opposition, 94 supporting government, and 9 coded as neutral. The neutral interventions are accounted for mainly by two conflicts, Cyprus and the Chadian civil war of 1978 to 1982. The data also demonstrate that a purely economic intervention strategy is rarely undertaken, while a strictly military strategy is the most common form of intervention (military, 73%; economic, 5%; mixed, 21%). The success of each type of intervention, regardless of the target, reflects an overall success rate of about 30 percent, with each individual type of intervention mirroring the overall success rate (see tables 2.3 and 2.4). The most successful intervention strategies have been either to support the government through military interventions (a success rate of just under 50%) or to intervene economically on behalf of the opposition, though only

TABLE 2.3. Success of Intervention Strategy by Conflict Type When Supporting Government

	TYPE OF INTERVENTION				Row Totals
	Military	Economic	Mixed		
Religious	6 ^a 3 ^b 50% ^c	0 0 0%	2 0 0%	8	
Ethnic	33 16 48%	0 0 0%	7 2 28%	40	
Ideological	24 11 46%	2 0 0%	20 7 35%	46	
Column Totals	63	2	29	94	Total Cases

Note: Overall Success Rate, 41%; ^a, ^b, and ^c apply to each group of figures.

^a Total cases.

^b Number successful.

^c % Successful.

when the parties to the conflict are organized along ethnic lines (60% successful). However, the small number of cases of purely economic interventions should breed caution in our inference. Interventions supporting the government were more than twice as likely to succeed as those supporting the opposition (41% vs. 17%).

Although I have assumed that interventions are undertaken to bring an end to the hostilities, it is conceivable that the interventions themselves prolong the conflict. A close look at the data suggests that this can be one consequence of interventions—and one with numerous examples—though not a necessary consequence as many alternative examples would make clear. The U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are two examples of intervention policies gone wrong. It is unlikely that either country intervened in order to create the quagmire that ensued, even though one consequence of the interventions appeared to be a prolonging of the conflict. The U.S. intervention in support of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan may, however, fit this mold of an intervention designed to prolong a conflict. Although there was a debate within decision-making circles as to the goal of U.S. policy—bleeding the Soviets or compelling their departure and thereby settling the conflict—there can be little doubt that the U.S. efforts made the Soviet's role more difficult, possibly prolonged the

TABLE 2.4. Success of Intervention Strategy by Conflict Type When Supporting Opposition

	TYPE OF INTERVENTION			
	Military	Economic	Mixed	
Religious	7 ^a 0 ^b 0%	0 0 0%	2 2 100%	9
Ethnic	31 4 13%	5 3 60%	2 0 0%	38
Ideological	35 6 17%	3 0 0%	6 1 17%	44
Column Totals	73	8	10	91
Total Cases				

Note: Overall Success Rate, 17%; ^a, ^b, and ^c apply to each group of figures.

^aTotal cases.

^bNumber successful.

^c% Successful.

conflict, and surely contributed to the Soviet decision to withdrawal (Scott 1996). One empirical question worth exploring is whether the interventions in the 70 percent of the cases that were not successful contributed to the prolonging of the conflict rather than its amelioration. Pearson (1974) gives some reason to suspect that this might be one consequence of military interventions, though the evidence is far from conclusive. Although always subject to potential liabilities associated with counterfactual inferences, some exploratory analysis can shed light on the question of whether interventions necessarily prolong a conflict.

Empirically, the mean duration of all ongoing conflicts is just over 16 years, regardless of whether there have been outside interventions. At the same time, the mean duration of all conflicts that have been settled, and had outside interventions, is seven years. Thirty-eight of these conflicts (20%) lasted one year or less, 62 percent of which had at least one intervention, with the intervention succeeding just over 60 percent of the time. Excluding those conflicts that lasted less than a year brings the mean duration up to nine years. In conflicts in which there were no interventions, the mean duration was only 1.5 years, with the longest conflict lasting only a decade. In general this supports the notion that outside interventions contribute to the prolonging of the conflict. However, two questions would need to be addressed before one can infer anything approaching a causal relationship: (1) do multiple interventions make resolution more intractable? and (2) do third parties generally intervene in conflicts of long duration rather than contributing to the length of the conflict? An affirmative answer to the first question suggests a causal process between interventions and the extension of the conflict; an affirmative answer to the second question points to a spurious inference from the data.

Addressing the first question is fairly straightforward, and although somewhat tempered by the response to the second question, it also helps to answer it. For all resolved conflicts that had outside interventions, if there were multiple intervenors, the mean duration was just under nine years. For those conflicts with only one intervention, the mean duration was just over three years. Not only are interventions associated with longer running conflicts, but also it seems that the more intervenors involved, the more likely that the conflict will be a long one. In fact, almost all the conflicts with one or two interventions were less than the nine-year mean duration (92%), and better than four out of five of those conflicts with three interventions lasted less than nine years (83%). However, when there are four intervenors, only two out of five (38%) conflicts end before the mean duration of nine years, whereas with five or six intervenors, only about 50 percent of the conflicts are shorter than nine years in length (see table 2.5).

The question of whether states tend to intervene in conflicts of long duration, rather than the interventions themselves prolonging the hostilities, cannot be answered definitively with the data at hand. The preceding data on single and multiple interventions suggests that some interventions may extend the length of

the conflict by making resolution efforts more difficult, particularly when there are multiple intervenors. There also appears to be no systematic relationship between the number of intervenors and the number of casualties (table 2.6), contributing to the inference that, in general, interventions take place across a broad spectrum of intrastate conflicts, and that more outside actors do not necessarily result in a more violent conflict—at least in terms of overall casualties.

Those conflicts without interventions have their own distinctive patterns. Of the 49 conflicts, 31 (63%) have been resolved, while 18 remained ongoing as of 1994. The mean duration of those conflicts in which the fighting had ended was just short of 1.5 years; the mean duration of those ongoing conflicts without third parties intervening is nearly 18 years. Seventy-two percent of those that have been resolved lasted one year or less, while 44 percent (8 of 18) of the ongoing conflicts have been under way for at least 15 years. Those conflicts without interventions are distributed in much the same geographic patterns as those with interventions, with Asia and Africa accounting for 33 percent each, the Americas and the Middle

TABLE 2.5. Number of Intervenor and the Duration of the Conflict

Number of Intervenor	Longer Than		Less Than	
	Mean Duration (%)		Mean Duration (%)	
1	24		76	
2	27		73	
3	28		72	
4	63		37	
5	52		48	
6	50		50	

Note: Mean duration = 9 years.

TABLE 2.6. Number of Intervenor and Number of Casualties

Number of Intervenor	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES		
	<4,000	4K through 27K	>27,000
1	19	11	8
2	10	8	19
3	6	17	20
4	11	11	8
5	5	5	19
6	6	0	6

East 13 percent and 15 percent, respectively, and Europe only 6 percent. The majority of the conflicts without outside intervenors took place along ethnic divisions (54%); ideological conflicts accounted for 31 percent of these cases, and religious conflicts, 15 percent. Furthermore, comparing the extent of the casualties across conflicts with and without interventions contributes to the inference that these are important differences that in part determine the outcome of an intervention. For example, the number of casualties falling into each of the quartiles reveals that conflicts with interventions tend to be bloodier than those without third-party interventions. Whether this is one piece of the selection criteria used by potential intervenors or is the result of the interventions themselves will be taken up in the next chapter (see table 2.7).

A clear understanding of whether or not an intervention prolongs a conflict requires certain a priori knowledge of how long the conflict would have lasted without the interventions—or with fewer intervenors. If one is to conclude that a conflict was prolonged because of an intervention, then it is necessary to demonstrate how long the conflict would have lasted without the intervention. The preceding descriptive evidence gives some basis for drawing such inferences, but the counterfactual argumentation poses a formidable challenge to overcome. Unfortunately this counterfactual argument is one that constrains much of social science research (Tetlock and Belkin 1996), and one for which conclusive systematic evidence will not be forthcoming in the short term. The alternative argument—that interventions take place in long-running conflicts and those with greater numbers of casualties—has some basis in the decision-making logic, as we will explore in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion of coding rules, sources, and the description of the data was intended simply to lay the groundwork for the chapters that follow. As a result

TABLE 2.7. Distribution of Mean Number of Casualties by Quartile and Intervention Status

	QUARTILE		
	25%	50%	75%
Intervention	3,000	20,000	122,000
Nonintervention	1,000	5,000	20,000

of the descriptive statistics, we know how the conflicts are distributed across geographic, ethnic, religious, and ideological dimensions; we know who is intervening and with what instruments; and we know the extent to which interventions are effective at contributing to a halt in the fighting. Although meaningful inferences are difficult to draw at this juncture, these descriptions are useful for setting the stage for the chapters that follow.

The following three chapters address questions of (1) when do states intervene? (2) what conditions contribute to successful interventions? and (3) how do multilateral interventions differ from unilateral ones? Each chapter starts by presenting the theoretical framework that can guide our understanding. I then articulate hypotheses from those arguments and subsequently test those hypotheses against the data discussed in this chapter. The next chapter focuses on tackling the selection bias problem that is inherent in attempts to evaluate the outcome of policy. We can only evaluate those instances in which the policy of interest (in this case interventions) was chosen, yet to do this effectively we need to know when or under what conditions the decision will be made not to intervene. I will begin to address this issue by developing a decision-theoretic model that we can use to think about the conditions under which the intervention option will be chosen or rejected. This essentially posits that decision makers go through a cost-benefit maximizing procedure: we can then consider the various factors that influence the expected net benefits from policy choices. I will not go through an extensive formalization of this decision logic but simply use it to make more explicit the criteria by which alternatives are judged. This chapter is necessary less for its intrinsic policy relevance than for its usefulness in setting up the discussion in the chapter that follows it. It is difficult to judge the results of the fourth chapter—the main focus of this study—without first having some sense of the criteria and outcomes spelled out in the third chapter.

I argue in chapter 3 that costs are a function of both the international and domestic environments, as are potential benefits. The decision-theoretic framework also makes clear that subjective estimates—by the potential intervenor—of the probability of achieving a successful outcome are critical to understanding when an intervention will be undertaken. Tests that capture some of the main components of the model give us insights into the selection criteria and allow us to more systematically evaluate the conditions associated with successful interventions, the topic taken up chapter 4.

If one of the critical factors in deciding to intervene is an a priori estimation of when an intervention policy is likely to be successful, then decision makers currently seem to rely more on ad hoc criteria than a systematic evaluation. In the fourth chapter I propose a model that suggests that intervenors are trying to manipulate both the net costs from continued fighting, and the expectations that each side holds regarding the effect of the intervention on their adversary. In

essence, an intervention is trying to make it too costly to one side and convince everybody that this is so. The results of the multivariate analysis will then point to more effective strategies for intervening under given sets of conditions. Combining the results of chapters 3 and 4 should point to a set of conditions that increase the probability of effective interventions.

The Conditions for Successful Interventions

The central focus of this book is on understanding the outcome of interventions, the topic that I take up in this chapter. From a policy perspective this is the critical piece of information, for it is the understanding of what has and has not worked in the past that helps shape future policies. This chapter evaluates past intervention efforts along a number of dimensions to identify those conditions that have a greater probability of leading to a successful outcome. Based on the previous chapter we have a sense of when interventions are likely, and as I argued in that chapter the political nature of intervention decisions ties the likelihood of intervention to the perceived probability that a given intervention policy will ultimately succeed.

There are two ways to think about determining the likelihood of the success of an intervention strategy: (1) in terms of a general policy of intervention, regardless of any selection criteria as to the type of conflict, and (2) in terms of particularly difficult cases faced by the policy community. This second category would be those intense conflicts in which large numbers of people are being killed in a relatively short period of time. We know that as the intensity of the conflict increases the probability of an outside intervention decreases. This is an understandable response given the reluctance with which policymakers would choose to undertake a "nonwinnable" policy. In fact, as the intensity of the conflict reaches rather extreme levels the probability of an intervention becomes quite low. But we also know that the greater the level of social dislocations associated with the conflict, the more likely is an outside intervention. To some degree this sets up a

Chapter 4 is a substantially revised version of my article "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (1996): 336-59. I am grateful to acknowledge Sage Publications, Inc., for this earlier work.

policy conundrum with the intensity of the conflict—epitomized by the extreme slaughter—weighing in against an intervention, and public anxiety over humanitarian issues and concerns over national security arguing for an intervention. The dilemma among the policy community over what might work in these types of situations calls for greater attention by the academic community. In short, cases of intense civil conflicts give us a useful analytical comparison to the broader population of third-party interventions and gives policymakers additional information from which to make choices.

Examples of Cases and Decisions

To frame the issues at hand, I begin with a brief—and somewhat anecdotal—history of two civil conflicts in which third parties intervened. The first case is that of Zaïre (then—and now—called the Congo) in 1967 and the Belgian and U.S. interventions; the second will be the Sri Lankan conflict starting in 1982 between the Tamil separatists and the government, with India intervening militarily. These cases are two of many potential examples, but they are rather interesting cases that should illuminate some of the issues to be discussed.

The 1967 Zaïrean conflict is often referred to as the Katanga mutiny because it was led by a group of largely European mercenaries and a mutinous group of soldiers from the Congolese army. After a postindependence civil war lasting the better part of five years, the Congolese government achieved a reasonable level of normalcy. This relative quiet was a welcome relief to the United States and Western Europe, who considered the civil war to be an integral part of the East-West struggle and suspected the Soviet Union of funneling arms to the opposition. Little direct evidence of Soviet involvement was found, though the Soviets did make offers of arms and advisers to the fledgling government. Many of the former Belgian colonists who decided to remain after independence were from the Katanga region and were the proprietors of the large mining and banking concerns. The civil war from 1960 to 1965 was largely fought over attempts to secede the Katanga region from the Congo and declare an independent state. Despite numerous attempts by the UN, the United States, and to some degree the Belgians to reintegrate Katanga and the primary opposition leader, Mr. Tshombe, into the Congolese government, these attempts ultimately failed and led to his exile, trial, and conviction (U.S. Department of State 1994).

On July 5, 1967, the mutineers, led by Jean Schramme, a Belgian businessman turned mercenary, attacked the town of Kisanangani, killing and wounding hundreds of government troops and civilians. What started as a band of about 100 opposition troops grew to a force of more than 1,000 and presented a serious challenge

to the government in Kinshasa. Not only would the cessation of the Katanga region pose a serious threat to the stability of the Congolese government of Mobutu, but it would eliminate the resources produced in this region from the coffers of the central government. To prevent the defeat of his government forces in the Katanga region, President Mobutu requested assistance from the United States and Belgium. For its part the United States provided military transport planes that moved Zaïrean troops and equipment up to the front lines. Most seem to agree that the support of the United States contributed considerably to the morale of the Zaïrean troops and the ultimate settlement of the conflict. Contrary to the requests by Mobutu, Belgium's role tended to favor the opposition forces—aligned largely with business interests with ties to Belgium—by punishing the government economically. Their intervention turned out to be largely unsuccessful.

Some points about the conflict and the intervention deserve mention. The number of casualties was low, and the conflict itself played out over a relatively short time. The combatants split over essentially ideological lines, with ethnicity or religious orientation playing little or no role. To the United States, the East-West issue loomed large (U.S. Department of State 1994). The U.S. intervention involved the supply of military logistic support to the Zaïrean government, which proved instrumental in stemming the tide of the opposition initiatives. According to published accounts and declassified U.S. documents, Zaïre's troops were proving woefully inadequate at taking the fight to the mercenaries, and in the process morale was rapidly fading. The U.S. logistical assistance apparently did two things: (1) helped organize and focus the government's offensive, and (2) demonstrated to the opposition that there would be an overwhelming force arrayed against them. The mutiny was relatively short-lived with the mercenaries commandeering planes or boats or finding a way out of the country on foot. From the U.S. perspective, the intervention was highly successful and relatively cost free; the outcome for the Belgians was markedly less desirable.

The Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka is quite a different conflict from the Katanga mutiny in Zaïre. First, the conflict is organized along ethnic lines, with the minority Tamilese demanding autonomy from the majority Singalese. Second, the conflict has been raging for an extended time, having roots that go back decades and with the main thrust of the conflict starting in 1982. The number of casualties, both combatants and noncombatants, has been high. Furthermore, a few presidents and prime ministers in both Sri Lanka and India have been assassinated by people with direct links to the conflict. The Tamil separatists have ethnic affinities to the Tamilese people in the state of Tamil Nadu in India, resulting in domestic pressures on the Indian government to defend the Tamilese in Sri Lanka. There is reason to believe that the prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, wanted to maintain the support of the government in Tamil Nadu and helping the Tamils in Sri Lanka was

one mechanism to do so (Brogan 1989). The Indians ultimately sent in a military force of upwards of 60,000 troops in an attempt to bring a halt to the fighting (Diehl 1993).

The Indian intervention resulted from a negotiated agreement with the Sri Lankan government identifying principles of a resolution to the conflict. One aspect of this conflict resolution process was the Indian intervention. To many of the Singalese majority this was a violation of their sovereignty and a "sell-out" by their government to the demands of the Indians. To most observers the intervention was initially seen as an attempt to assist the Tamils by constraining the government's ability to suppress their movement. This was consistent with Indian relief drops to the Tamilse strongholds, in violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty in June of 1987, and with the pressure from ethnically homogeneous groups in the state of Tamil Nadu. Even though the Indian intervention was designed to produce conditions conducive to a cease-fire, factions within the Tamilse movement increased the tempo of their military efforts, leading to the Indian military suppressing the Tamilse. By the time the Indian troops withdrew in 1990 they had achieved a level of brutality barely matched by the Tamilse or the Singalese and never came close to bringing a halt to the fighting. The conflict still rages on today.

Two interventions into two different types of conflicts result in two quite different outcomes. The following argument suggests that the conditions for success or failure of the intervention can be tied to the characteristics of the conflict and the strategy used to intervene. If decision makers had a reasonably good grasp of the types of interventions that worked under various conditions, then efforts to control the violent aspects of civil conflicts might have a greater impact on the ultimate steps toward the resolution of the issues at stake. It is considerably more difficult to negotiate resolutions when the combatants are in the midst of armed conflict. What follows will contribute to the development of a framework with which civil conflicts can be managed, possibly facilitating diplomatic efforts targeted at resolution.

Classifying Interventions

Although our theoretical and empirical understanding of the conditions that effect the success or failure of third-party interventions are rather meager, the need for greater attention has already been made clear. Alexander George (1995), for instance, makes the case that for coherent conflict management policy to be articulated and implemented, policymakers need systematic information on (1) strategies for conflict resolution, (2) specific knowledge of the conditions under which such strategies tend to succeed or fail, and (3) the role played by the various actors in determining the outcome of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the gen-

eration of that systematic knowledge in a manner that should increase the coherence of the policy process. However, there are limitations to what will be derived from this analysis, with certain types of conflicts and some forms of intervention being left out. Not all conflicts are created equal, and unfortunately neither do they all fit nicely into one analytical package.

Of importance in decisions over where and how to intervene in civil conflicts are two general categories of information: (1) characteristics of the conflict and (2) characteristics of the intervention. Aspects of the domestic and international political arena would have already played their hands in the decision over whether or not to intervene. Once that decision has been made, it is the characteristics of the conflict and the strategy for intervening that will have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the policy.

The decision to intervene in an intrastate conflict reflects, *inter alia*, concerns over who is fighting and why; as such, one critical aspect of the decision calculus will involve the cultural characteristics of the disputants. Likewise, the makeup of the participants to the conflict affects the strategy for and likelihood of successful third-party interventions. For example, a conflict rooted in ethnic or religious grievances may be more amenable to outside interventions than ideological conflicts, even though the latter may be just as likely to attract intervenors. Intergroup grievances are often tied to discriminations and disadvantages between the conflicting parties, as well as their distinct cultural identities (Gurr 1993). The specific character of these opposition groups, therefore, should influence the intervention strategy used to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Not only will some types of conflicts be more susceptible than others to outside interventions, but also the knowledge of the differing effect of the root causes of the conflict on the likely success of an intervention would be useful to policymakers grappling with the decision over how to intervene. Kaufmann (1996) argues that the nature of identity patterns influences the effectiveness of outside military interventions in resolving conflicts. According to his theoretical reasoning, the ability to assume or discard a particular identity will affect the veracity with which the combatants adhere to their positions. Ethnic identity is more difficult to shed than either religious or ideological orientations, on the one hand making it easier to design solutions to the conflict, but on the other increasing the polarization of the groups in conflict.

Three contrasting examples will help illuminate the influence of the orientation of the groups in conflict on the likelihood of a successful third-party intervention. The now familiar jihad, or Holy War, where religious fundamentalist groups are fighting to oust the infidels has taken center stage in some parts of the world. Islamic groups in Afghanistan, for instance, have taken the struggle to such a feverish pitch that the war to expel the Soviets appeared somewhat tame by comparison. When the Mujahideen successfully defeated the Soviet-backed government in 1990, many thought the troubles in Afghanistan were over. But when the

victorious Mujahideen broke into factions, religious differences became the most salient operative variable in the renewed conflict. Certainly other factors such as power struggles and historical animosities contribute to the vigor with which the conflict is waged, but it is the religious orientation that dominates the divisions between the warring parties. The civil war in Nicaragua that overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979 had a different character. The opposition groups, led by the Sandinista party, were composed of various segments of the Nicaraguan society. Leading members of the ruling party—most notably members of the Chamorro family—sided with peasants and Marxists to challenge the legitimacy of the Somoza government. Although working under a common banner to overthrow the government, the Sandinista opposition did not all share common values as to the form that a new government would take; the subsequent reinitiation of the conflict under the banner of the “contra” movement reflected, in part, the nebulous makeup of the Sandinista coalition. The Eritreans in Ethiopia waged a decades-long struggle for independence, and throughout ebbs and flows in their fortunes in battle they maintained sufficient organizational support to eventually prevail in the struggle. The roots of the civil war can be linked back to the process of colonization and decolonization, with the ethnic Eritreans being denied the right to their own nation through the vagaries of the colonial system.

Each of the conflicts has similarities with the other two, but the differences are of most importance to us. If we think about these conflicts from the perspective of identity—which Kaufmann uses as the key determinant of the success or failure of military interventions—then the Eritrean and the Afghan conflicts reflect situations in which the geographic entity, the country, is occupied by separate nations; to a large degree members of one nation control the state apparatus. So there is one country with two or more nations fighting over issues of self-determination, or identity. In the Nicaraguan conflict, with its ideological orientation, you have one country, one nation, but a disagreement over the economic, political, and social direction that the current ruling coalition is taking. Burton (1990) raises these issues of identity to the level of a “Rosetta stone” for the understanding and resolution of conflict. Although he acknowledges that addressing questions of identity can require long-term strategies, short-term steps at conflict settlement must also be attended to—and are affected by—the makeup of the groups in conflict. If issues of identity play such a key role in the initiation of civil conflicts and their ultimate resolution, then those same issues of identity will affect the relative effectiveness of third-party interventions. Conflicts that have no easy lines of demarcation, and where the calculations of the combatants are determined more by emotions and history than by gains and losses, may require intervention strategies that differ from those conflicts with a different set of identity patterns.

The mechanisms for intervening in intrastate conflicts are also varied. For example, the UN identifies three goals in terms of resolving ongoing conflicts: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Each goal requires a different strategy of intervention. Although advocated under the banner of multilateral interventions (which I deal with in chapter 5), the first of these relies primarily on the acumen of the available diplomatic corps; the other two initiatives generally entail the use of military and/or economic instruments. For a number of reasons diplomacy is a distinct category of intervention from either the military or economic variety, and it is the latter two that are the focus of this analysis. Even though these two forms of intervention are often undertaken jointly—as they were, for instance, in Bosnia—for analytical purposes the isolation of the more intrusive forms of intervention can help to clarify some of the policy issues that decision makers regularly confront. Furthermore, many acknowledge that stopping the fighting is a prerequisite for diplomatic initiatives to take root (Diehl 1993; Hampson 1996; Mitchell and Banks 1997; Smith 1995).

An effective strategy for intervening incorporates a mix of the appropriate instruments with the right target. Outside interventions, for example, involve military, economic, or a mix of the two instruments, and they can take place on behalf of the government or opposition forces. Much of the prescriptive advice that has been forthcoming in the policy journals has tended to follow an implicit formula of assuming that the intervention would be on behalf of the government in power (e.g., Comaughon 1992; Haass 1994; Howe 1995; Kanter and Brooks 1994). But as the evidence in chapter 2, and much of the cold war policy from the United States and the Soviet Union has made clear, support for the opposition is often the policy choice. The effectiveness of the intervention attempt is influenced by whether a state supports the opposition or the government. Reasons of efficiency, legitimacy, and logistics all support this notion, yet the impact of these factors may differ across intervention instruments. For example, economic coercion—generally thought of as sanctions—may be more effective when targeted at the government than the opposition, because it is conceptually and practically difficult to embargo an organized rebel movement. At the same time, imposing sanctions on a government is considerably easier. However, military aid, in terms of hardware, may have a greater relative impact when in support of the opposition rather than the government. The government may already have a preponderance of capabilities over the opposition, so each additional unit of military equipment would only change the balance of capabilities by a small amount. On the other hand, a relatively modest supply of military hardware may increase substantially the capabilities of the opposition vis-à-vis the government. An intervention with military force, likewise, may be more effective when in support of the government, because the international community would hardly consider the deploy-

ment of troops against a recognized government as a legitimate action (although it has been done on a number of occasions), thereby limiting the ability of the intervenor to make the most effective use of its forces.

Although military interventions may be the most visible, they are not the only form of third-party intervention into intrastate conflicts. Economic instruments can be, and have been, a forceful tool with which to intervene in ongoing domestic disputes, both through positive inducements and punitive sanctions. The debate over whether or not sanctions will achieve a desired outcome echoes in both academic and policy circles. During the buildup to the Gulf War against Iraq, many in the U.S. Congress and in the various European parliaments were arguing over the track record of economic sanctions, with one group suggesting that they would work given enough time and the other claiming that they just never work. A similar debate resonates through the halls of academe (Baldwin 1985; Cortright and Lopez 1995).

In many intervention attempts, moreover, we are likely to see a mix of strategies, with economic inducements or punishments used alongside their military counterparts. Combining military and economic instruments increases the range of areas from which an intervention can manipulate the calculations of the combatants as they try to determine the utility from continued fighting. In effect, what I have outlined is a classificatory scheme by which we can think about third-party interventions. We have three general types of intrastate conflict: ethnic, religious, and ideological; three basic strategies for intervening in these conflicts: military, economic, and mixed strategies; and the target of the intervention identified as either the government or the opposition. What is critical at this juncture is to outline the goals of the intervenor and a theoretical framework from which we can understand any particular choice of strategy and its effectiveness.

The Logic Behind Interventions and the Mechanisms for Success

Earlier I discussed why certain characteristics of the conflict or aspects of the intervention itself would contribute to the success or failure of the policy, but I didn't address the question of just what interventions attempt to do and how they do so. If we go back to our assumption of decision makers as rational actors, we can get a sense of the logic behind an intervention and its effect on the course of a conflict. Even in the thick of a civil conflict, the leadership in both the opposition and the government need to calculate the costs and benefits of the various options available for carrying forward the struggle. An outside intervention is an attempt to alter those calculations in a manner that leads to the outcome preferred by the intervening party. As Freedman (1994) argues, military interventions are a method

of altering the constellation of forces within the conflict to the extent that it influences the relative balance of power. To many adherents of the realist model of world politics it is the relative balance of capabilities that determines when states go to war, and conversely, when they sue for peace (Morganthau 1967; Wagner 1993; Waltz 1979).

Given this understanding of the mechanisms that drive decisions regarding the initiation and termination of hostilities, the key to any intervention strategy is to alter the calculations by which the antagonists arrive at particular outcomes. Focusing on the outcome of the end of the violence, an intervention strategy needs to make it too costly for the combatants to continue fighting. This can be achieved by either making the actual costs of fighting prohibitively high or by making the benefits of not fighting particularly attractive. A successful intervention strategy, then, will result in a cost-benefit calculation by the antagonists that leads to not fighting providing the highest expected outcome. The overwhelming force used by the outside parties in the Bosnian conflict was designed to make it clear that continued fighting would come at an unacceptably high cost. This was evident in the NATO bombings of the Bosnian-Serb positions overlooking Sarajevo prior to the Dayton agreements, where explicit warnings were made that linked continued shelling of the city to the near certain destruction of the weapons and positions used in the attacks. The Bosnian-Serbs, it appeared, learned the lesson rather quickly, as did the Belgian mercenaries in the Katanga province of Zaïre in 1967 after the United States intervened with military support for the government. The same logic influenced the scale of the intervention by NATO troops in the post-Dayton period. It seems clear that the massive use of force altered not only the balance of forces but also the calculations in the various ruling coalitions. Equally important to increasing the cost of continued fighting, however, was the promise of rewards if all parties abided by the terms of the cease-fire.

In chapter 3 I articulated the decision-making logic from the perspective of the potential intervenor and argued that the decision was not strategic in the sense of the actions of the target influencing the calculations of the intervenor. However, the effect of the intervention—and the actions that it contributes to—is such that an intervention leads to a strategic calculation on the part of the combatants. In this sense the response to the intervention is a function of the antagonists' expectations about the effect of the intervention on the opposing side in the conflict. In other words, A's decision of whether and how to intervene in a conflict between B and C will reflect A's expected payoff from the intervention. As discussed earlier, this expected payoff incorporates information about domestic and international constraints, the expected benefits from a successful policy, and the subjective probability of the outcome of the conflict with and without an intervention. The objective of the resultant policy, however, is to influence calculations by the combatants about the relative costs and benefits of continued fighting and

the prospects for achieving their desired outcome if they do continue the struggle militarily. The combatants' decision in this regard reflects a strategic calculation by the opposition (B) and the government (C) about the effect of the intervention on the other's willingness to press on with the military aspects of the conflict. So, for instance, B's calculations will reflect in part B's expectations about the effect of the intervention on C, and vice versa.

The choice of the decision maker in the intervening state is to determine this optimal strategy given the context of the conflict, the decision rules of the antagonists, and the expected probability of any one strategy securing the cessation of hostilities. This is where the characteristics of the conflict and the strategy for intervening come to the fore. Since the effect of an intervention plays out through the strategic calculations between the combatants, getting both sides to the conflict to determine that ending the fighting is in their best interest may be a difficult task. The task, moreover, is complicated by the differing characteristics of the conflict. For instance, a military intervention into an ideological conflict may alter the balance of capabilities to the extent that one side opts to negotiate rather than fight, but it seems just as likely that the intervention may send the opposing side out in search of additional weapons from its ideological patrons. Furthermore, simply ratcheting up the level of hostility might not lead to the strategic calculation by either side that negotiating is in its interest. Depending on the scale of the sunk costs—which we can think of in terms of the number of casualties—it may take an economic incentive to contribute to the calculation that a “ripe” environment is presenting itself.

The strategic calculation that an outside intervention must influence can be expressed as: $EU_i = (\text{Costs}_i + \text{Benefits}_i) \times j^*$, where EU_i reflects the expected utility to actor i from an intervention, Costs_i reflect the costs of continued fighting, Benefits_i reflect the benefits from terminating the hostilities, and j^* reflects actor i 's perception of actor j 's estimated expected utility from the intervention. If j^* is low (or conversely, i^*) then the expected payoff from an intervention to actor i is going to be low and the likelihood that the intervention will be successful correspondingly low. The mechanisms for intervening under these conditions that have the greatest probability of a successful outcome would be those that increase the costs to both sides from continued fighting, increase the benefits to both from agreeing to put down the guns, and does so in a manner that both sides come to a similar conclusion.

Given this framework, the strategy for intervening should influence the likely success of any intervention attempt. The strategy can be conceived of in terms of both the type and the target of the intervention. Either military or economic interventions can be used to influence both the costs and the benefits of the combatants' decision about whether or how to continue the conflict. Each approach to

intervening potentially taps into separate mechanisms to affect the decision calculus. Economic incentives, for example, might offer rewards for a quick settlement, whereas military support might increase the battlefield constraints on one of the parties (affecting both the costs of continued fighting and the benefits from stopping). The offer of redevelopment assistance, for instance, may sufficiently increase the costs of fighting and the potential benefits from restraint to influence the perceptions by both antagonists that a cease-fire proposal is serious. Military support for either side could have a similar sobering impact on the likelihood of a halt to the fighting. The combined effect of economic and military instruments should be able to influence the course of the conflict well beyond the ability of either individual strategy. In a sense, then, the combined effect may be greater than the sum of the parts. We might expect, therefore, that under normal conditions a mixed intervention will have the best chance of achieving a successful outcome. From the perspective of the combatants, the ability to sustain a united front against an opponent will involve both the degree of support within the constituent base and the relative alignment of military forces; each of these can be manipulated by outside parties.

From a political vantage point economic constraints or inducements can partially contribute to the allegiances of the constituents behind either of the centers of sovereignty. Using sanctions or rewards to move this center of support toward a more compromising approach to the conflict should be effective in altering the calculus of the opposing leaderships. But an economic intervention probably is not sufficient, under normal circumstances, to bring an end to the fighting. The balance of military forces will also contribute to the expected outcome of the combatants, and military interventions are used to alter the relative capability of the opposing forces. Equally matched forces, for example, may lead to the perception of an impending stalemate, while a preponderance of military capabilities may give reason to push for further gains. But neither would military intervention by itself be the most effective strategy; in the norm, to move the parties far enough toward a compromise that an end to the fighting would be a likely outcome. Intuitively at least, military interventions often seem to exacerbate a bad situation leading to increased conflict rather than its diminution. As we recently saw in Somalia, a vastly superior military force simply became a target for the antagonists previously pitted against each other; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also serves as a poignant example. This need to sway both the cost-benefit calculations and the perception of the likely effect of the intervention on the opponent would suggest that a mixed strategy should be more likely to succeed than either a military or economic intervention alone. Furthermore, given the logic of how the intervention purports to influence decision making, there is little reason to expect, *inter alia*, that a military or an economic intervention independently will be more

successful than the other. The context under which a nonmixed strategy will give the upper hand to a military or economic initiative is critically important, though those specific conditions under which one is more effective than the other deserves more concerted attention than is possible here.

The strategy for intervening, moreover, is also a function of the target chosen by the intervenor. Political imperatives often dictate who will be supported and who opposed by the outside party, but targeting the government or the opposition should not have the same probability of a successful outcome of the intervention, all else being equal. For reasons associated with the disparity in resources between the central government and the opposition forces, in general we would expect the existing balance of power to side with the ruling coalition. At the same time the efficiency of any third-party intervention should be greater when the intervention attempt supports the sitting government. Military interventions supporting opposition forces usually violate the spirit and the letter of international law and the charter of the U.N. As such they would tend to be more clandestine, more difficult to organize logistically, and less likely to have a smooth flow from the donor through the leadership in exile (or in a "secure" enclave within the disputed territory), and out to the soldiers in the field. By contrast, military aid in support of the government is official, aboveboard, and distributed through an existing network for supply and integration. But simply because the government is the conduit for third-party interventions does not imply that governments are usually the recipients of third-party support. For instance, support for one side in the conflict can result from positive inducements to the supported side or negative sanctions to the opposing side. If we think about Singer's (1963) model of international influence, threatening or punishing the opposition can be interpreted as intervening on behalf of the government, as can the rewards or promises made directly to the government. However, for reasons of efficiency, legitimacy, and stability, support for the government should lead to more successful outcomes.

And, finally, who intervenes is important. For example, the role of the status of the intervenor should be a critical factor in the likely outcome of any intervention attempt. This, again, can be seen most clearly in the effect of the large European countries and the United States in the post-Dayton intervention in Bosnia. Larger countries have a greater degree of latitude when it comes to organizing an intervention strategy. Major powers not only have larger and more projectable military forces but also a wider range of economic resources that can be brought to bear in a foreign policy role. A small country offering economic incentives or imposing sanctions should have a different effect on the calculations of the combatants than a similar intervention by the United States. Regardless of the side on which a major power intervenes, the effectiveness of that intervention strategy should be greater than that of a similar strategy by a nonmajor power. The ability to affect the cost-benefit calculations of combatants in an intrastate conflict

must be a function, *inter alia*, of the resources that any potential intervenor can bring to bear.

From the preceding argument a number of hypotheses can be derived:

HYPOTHESIS 1

Interventions into civil conflicts will have a higher probability of success when they involve mixed strategies rather than single focused strategies.

When trying to influence the expected payoffs from continuing versus stopping the fighting, intervenors need to manipulate as many variables as possible. Furthermore the intervention must influence the subjective estimate of the likelihood of a positive expected payoff to both opposing groups in the conflict. Creating the expectation by the opposing sides of these positive payoffs should be advanced by pushing on both ends of the stick, so to speak. Mixed interventions can influence both the potential costs and benefits, and across a much broader spectrum, than either a military or economic intervention alone, and therefore should increase the probability that the intervention will be successful.

HYPOTHESIS 2

Interventions into civil conflicts will have a higher chance of success when targeted toward ethnic or religious, as opposed to ideological conflicts.

Even though ideological identity should be easier to shed than ethnicity, the prospects for counterinterventions by patrons for the opposing side increase the likelihood that an intervention will not contribute to a cessation of the fighting. The temporal aspects of a conflict should also influence the willingness of the combatants to agree to halt the fighting (either through defeat, capitulation, or cease-fire). Ideological conflicts generally do not have the option of postponing the fight until better conditions prevail, as do long-running ethnic or religious conflicts. The current strife in Bosnia, for instance, is often discussed in terms of repressed animosities successfully kept in check by the authority of the Tiro regime. Religious conflicts, moreover, should be somewhat more amenable to outside interventions than ethnic conflicts because it is easier to shed religious identity than it is ethnic identity.

HYPOTHESIS 3

There will be a higher probability of success when the intervention supports the ruling coalition rather than opposition forces.

In general, efficiency is increased when the intervention supports the government, and even though a military intervention in support of the opposition may disproportionately increase the opposition's capabilities relative to the same policy in support of the government, this would probably not offset the effect of efficiency. Furthermore, a military intervention on behalf of opposition forces generally violates international laws and norms, restricting the scope of potential forms of support for the opposition. The government's subjective estimate of the likely effect of the intervention in support of the opposition will generally be low, decreasing the expected utility from stopping the violence.

HYPOTHESIS 4

The probability of a successful intervention decreases as the number of casualties increase.

When the sunk costs of a conflict are already high, an incremental increase in the cost of that conflict will have little effect on the veracity with which the groups contest. Likewise, benefits that might accrue from an intervention are marginalized when they have to overcome such extreme pressure to right the wrongs of the conflict by taking the struggle more aggressively to the opponent. Because both sides would have a similarly entrenched attitude, both of the antagonists' subjective estimate of the effect of an intervention on the adversary would be small.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, however, conflicts with a high number of casualties are more likely to attract outside parties, with the interventions driven largely by domestic political concerns. But the fact that countries are more likely to select themselves into these interventions does not make them more likely to succeed. What we have are situations where third parties are increasingly likely to intervene in conflicts in which they are increasingly likely to fail in their efforts, and strangely enough these conflicting preferences and outcomes make logical sense.

HYPOTHESIS 5

Interventions by major powers will tend to be more successful than the same intervention by a minor power.

This follows from the logic of trying to manipulate the costs and benefits of continued fighting. A major power not only has more resources (both military and economic) to bring to bear on the combatants, but also the combatants' subjective estimates of the effect on the opponent will also be higher than when a smaller

country intervenes. Major powers generally have more political influence, greater projectable forces, and a larger array of economic incentives or punishments. Relative to a nonmajor power these added capabilities should influence the effectiveness of an intervention.

Research Design and Testing

The hypotheses just discussed have been subjected to empirical examination against the data described in chapter 2. While I will not reiterate the data concerns at this time, I will discuss the models used to test the hypotheses. I opened this chapter with a suggestion that not all interventions are created equal; as such, it may be useful—both theoretically and practically—to carry out this analysis in two steps. The first examines the conditions for successful interventions across the entire range of conflict intensity; the second separates out those cases that portend to pose particularly vexing problems for the decision-making community; namely, ones that rage at a rather high level of intensity. Intense civil conflicts differ from the more general case on a number of dimensions that suggest there is analytical and policy benefits to be gained from a more discriminating analysis. First, when the level of hostilities is high, the decision over intervention can take on the character of a crisis of a decision-making problem. The crisis can be a result of the domestic and international pressures to do something to stop the slaughter, but these pressures run counter to the perceived likelihood that any politically salient intervention will be effective. The time available for decisive action is short and policy advice is likely to be conflicting. Under these types of conditions policymakers need to know what works in this specific type of conflict, as opposed to a less violent variety. Second, because of the higher visibility of intense civil conflicts, the public is more concerned with the progression of the conflict and the outcome of any intervention policy (Blechman 1995; Kohut and Toth 1994). The media, accordingly, will follow these conflicts more closely, making the political costs associated with an intervention policy more immediately tangible. And, finally, because of the extreme conditions within intense civil conflicts, the risk associated with intervening are higher and the difficulty of tailoring an intervention to fit the conflict more difficult to implement. Obviously these factors are all interrelated and translate at some level into an increased risk of incurring unnecessarily high political costs for an attempted intervention. Under conditions of uncertainty, political leaders are more likely to do nothing when action is called for (Rwanda and Burundi are examples), or design a strategy for intervening that has a low probability of success because they do not have sufficient information from which to work. The ability to conceive of a success-

ful policy *ex ante* appears to be somewhat limited, so when leaders do choose to intervene in these types of conflicts, knowing the best strategy would be highly beneficial.

Intense Civil Conflicts

Conceptually an intense intrastate conflict is one that results in a large number of casualties in a relatively short period of time (Small and Singer 1982), though there are other ways to think about the intensity of a conflict. For instance, a conflict within a geostategically important country may be intense from a national security perspective, while one that threatens genocide against a particular ethnic group may be intense from a humanitarian orientation. For this analysis the intensity of the conflict was defined in terms of the number of casualties per year, with 10,000 casualties per year marking the operational cutoff between intense and nonintense conflicts. When people are dying in relatively large numbers, the conflict becomes increasingly visible outside the immediate geographic region and generates increasing pressure from nonstate interest groups. This has two immediate consequences. First, an intense conflict poses security concerns for geographically proximate countries. When the level of violence is high, neighboring countries must take note of the conflict and fear the potential threat to stability in their own country. Second, extreme levels of violence in intrastate conflicts tend to create widespread dislocations in the social infrastructure upon which large numbers of noncombatants depend. Movements of refugees, famines, and the proliferation of land mines are but just a few examples. This increased visibility puts pressure on other countries to do something. That “something” usually involves some form of intervention to help facilitate the end of hostilities.

Examples of some of the intrastate conflicts used in this analysis will illuminate the extent to which these cases capture public attention, threaten regional stability, and/or cause grave concern for issues of human rights and will set them apart analytically from the more general case of outside interventions in internal conflicts. In Somalia, between 1991 and 1994, deaths have averaged nearly 55,000 a year; over the five-year period this averages out to 4,500 deaths per month. Rwanda and Bosnia both top Somalia’s monthly average by considerable amounts (Rwanda, 10,000/month; Bosnia, 7,500/month), with Rwanda averaging well over 100,000 deaths per year between 1990 and 1994, with a particularly spasmodic episode of interethnic slaughter in the early part of 1994. Zaïre in the first half of the 1960s was also in the throes of an intense civil conflict, averaging more than 50,000 deaths per year. In each of these instances outside actors intervened in the conflict, though there are a number of intense conflicts in which no outside actors took part. The Rwandan conflict in 1965, Burundi 1988, and the original conflict over the breakup of Yugoslavia are examples of intense conflicts without outside

interventions. While the 10,000 fatalities per year cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, it is relatively insensitive to changes in the threshold.¹

Analytical Approach and Testing Procedures

In my empirical analysis I again employ a logistic regression estimator to evaluate the hypotheses articulated earlier. Then I use the results of that analysis to estimate the likelihood that a given strategy for intervening will be successful under a given set of conditions. The outlines of a logit regression and how it contributes to our understanding of the outcome of interventions deserves a brief reiteration. A logit regression allows the analyst to ask a question of the data that has a dichotomous answer, or outcome variable—in this case, whether an intervention was successful or not. Even though there are alternative ways to think about the outcome of interventions, by dichotomizing the outcome we reap the rewards of analytical parsimony and policy relevance. Let me explain why.

To adequately inform the decision-making community, social scientists have to pose questions in a manner consistent with that community. As I have argued, policymakers converse in a language more consistent with subjective estimates of the likely outcome of the proposed policy. A more traditional OLS regression procedure that would attempt to identify the effect of intervention policies over a range of potential outcomes is less efficient for a couple reasons. First, the outcomes from intervention policies that could be identified would be categorical and not placed on an interval scale as would be suggested by the notion of a spectrum of outcomes. Ordinary least squares estimations are not designed for these types of data. Furthermore, the interpretation of the results of the analysis are not only problematic methodologically but also confusing for the policy community. Interpreting OLS results involves some variation on the effect of a unit change in the explanatory variables on a unit change in the outcome variable. So, for instance, we might learn that moving from an ethnic to an ideological conflict (a one unit change in the explanatory variable) results in a .5 unit change along the range of outcomes. But a .5 unit change does not have a concrete meaning; there is no .5 outcome on a categorical scale. What is generally meant by such a statistical result is that varying the explanatory variables results in some movement along the string of artificially ordered nominal variables. How far along that spectrum? Well, that’s the difficult part to interpret because the method is inconsistent with the data; therefore, scholars as well as policymakers lack a clear understanding of the

¹ For example, little changes in the makeup of the cases until the threshold is lowered to 6,000 fatalities per year. Lowering the threshold to 8,000/year picks up only three additional conflicts; 7,000 fatalities picks up three, two of which run concurrently in Nigeria. At 6,000 fatalities, a total of 13 new conflicts are added to the list.

marginal effects of certain policies, and the policy community has nothing concrete to grasp.

Equally important, however, is the inability of OLS estimations to speak in the language of the policy community. One of the reasons I would contend, that the quantitative study of international relations has a relatively poor record *vis-à-vis* the economic discipline in their influence on policy is that the former group does not cultivate a policy audience. Economists, for example, can give an estimate of the effect of a rise in interest rates on the level of unemployment, and although they may be wrong as often as they are right, the policy community understands how to interpret their results (to a large degree economists work with data that permit a more intuitive interpretation). If the foreign policy community thinks and interacts in terms of subjective estimates of outcomes, then we increase our influence over this community by designing studies that convey information on terms similar to their deliberations. Dichotomizing the outcome of interventions allows us to carry out this task. What we lose in the initial analysis by the dichotomization can be recouped through more-nuanced discussions of specific incidents and a critical interpretation of the analysis. Given this background let me move to the results of the analysis.²

Results of the Analysis: The General Case

In this presentation of the results of the analysis I move from the general to the specific, reporting first on the success of third-party interventions in the entire sample of cases. This broad sample, you may recall, consists of 190 cases of interventions into 89 intrastate conflicts; the conflicts range from rather small events where fewer than 1,000 people were killed, to an upper bound where something approaching one million casualties resulted from the hostilities. Some of the less violent conflicts include the Sanyang coup in Gambia in 1981, the first Ogaden conflict in the early 1960s, and the Shaba crisis in Zaïre in 1977. The more violent conflicts tend to roll off the tongue with greater clarity, such as the Congo crisis of 1960–1965, Uganda in the 1980s, Somalia in the early 1990s, and the Sudanese civil war begun in the early 1980s, all of which resulted in casualties counted in the hundreds of thousands. Following a discussion of the more general case, I dis-aggregate the sample along the lines of the intensity of the conflict.

Table 4.1 presents the results of two models linking the characteristics of the conflict and the strategy for intervening to the outcome of an intervention. Model 1 represents a simple additive model where the strategy for intervening consists of the independent effects of characteristics of the conflicts, the choice of target,

and the instruments employed. Model 2 represents an interactive relationship between the two components of the intervenors' strategy, along with the characteristics of the conflict. Model 2 in this sense is a better representation of the implementation of an intervention strategy because it allows us to examine the effect of the instrument for intervening as it interacts with the chosen target, as opposed to two separate events. Decision makers often do not have the option of choosing the target—political imperatives determine who that will be—yet they need to know what works under the combination of alternatives presented to them. Initially what these coefficients tell us is the direction of the impact of each variable on the outcome of the intervention, where, for example, a negative coef-

TABLE 4.1. Results of Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Intervention, General Category of Interventions, $N = 189$

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Ethnic conflict	-.33 (.67)	-.34 (.71)
Ideological conflict	-.47 (.67)	-.37 (.70)
Mixed intervention	-.87* (.50)	
Supporting government	1.35** (.37)	
Casualties	-1.71 $\times 10^{-6}$ (1.67 $\times 10^{-6}$)	-2.28 $\times 10^{-6}$ (1.78 $\times 10^{-6}$)
Major power	1.09** (.41)	1.31** (.43)
Mixed support for government		.38 (.57)
Mixed support for opposition		.94 (.83)
Military support for government		1.96** (.45)
Economic support for opposition		.69 (.93)
Constant	-1.51** (.69)	-1.96** (.77)

Model 1: Log likelihood = 100.52
Chi square = 25.11, 6 degrees of freedom, $p < .000$

Model 2: Log likelihood = -96.21
Chi square = 33.72, 8 degrees of freedom, $p < .000$

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; numbers in () are standard errors.

² For a technical discussion of logit regression, see Greene 1993, Hanushek and Jackson 1977, or Kennedy 1987.

ficient means that that variable is associated with a decline in the probability of a successful outcome. Furthermore, each of the various indicators are captured with a series of dummy variables—with the exception of casualties—so that the intuitive interpretation is judged relative to the omitted variable in the model. For example, in both Models 1 and 2 ethnic and ideological conflicts are included in the model, but religious conflicts are left out. Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficient associated with the ethnic and ideological variables is judged relative to the likelihood of a successful intervention in a religious conflict. A negative coefficient suggests that interventions are less likely to be successful than in a religious conflict under similar conditions. In tables 4.2 and 4.3, I transform these coefficients into estimates of the probability of a successful outcome—a much easier metric to interpret.

Models 1 and 2 tell us something about the conditions or strategies for successful interventions in the general category of intrastate conflict. In Model 1, supporting the government appears to lead to a greater likelihood of success than support for the opposition, and we can reasonably expect that relationship to hold; likewise, there is support for the notion that major powers in general are more successful than nonmajor powers. The degree of statistical confidence in the remaining variables is weak, leading to caution regarding any inferences that might be drawn. Model 2—an interactive model capturing the strategy for intervention—is stronger than Model 1, though still not terribly robust. Major powers, again, are considerably more likely to be able to stop the fighting than nonmajor powers; military support for the government is considerably more likely to halt the fighting than military support for the opposition. In neither of these models, however, does there appear to be any evidence that the type of the conflict matters much in influencing the likely outcome of the intervention. Initially this would seem to run counter to the major premise of the work of Kaufmann (1996).

In general, what do we learn from these models and where can we take it? Tables 4.2 and 4.3 help in this regard, though we need to be cautious at this juncture in our interpretation because of our inability to confidently judge the “true” relationships as reflected in some of the weak support from tests of statistical robustness. Given these caveats, the transformation of the coefficients into probabilistic estimates of a successful outcome can point in some useful directions. One way to make use of the ability to transform logit coefficients into probability estimates is to judge the effect of the variables against some hypothetical case. We can then ask what the effect is of moving from the hypothetical conditions to some other condition, just as we did in chapter 3. In table 4.2, for instance, the probability of a change from failure to success is displayed for a given change in a specific explanatory variable from the base, using the results from Model 1. The hypothetical base used for comparative purposes is a conflict in which (1) the conflict is oriented around religious divisions, (2) the number of casualties were

toward the low end of the spectrum, (3) the intervention is by a nonmajor power, and (4) the intervention was a military intervention in support of the opposition. This hypothetical conflict, furthermore, is not totally hypothetical in that it is consistent with the conflict in Northern Ireland and Libya's support for the IRA, as well as the conflict in Lebanon, 1988–1990, with Israel's support for the opposition. According to both models, the probability of observing a successful intervention under these “hypothetical” conditions is at best 18 percent. The results of the analysis in Model 1 suggest, therefore, that if you had the same intervention

TABLE 4.2. Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Intervention on the Probability of Success, Model 1, General Category

Base	Probability of Success (%)	Change in Probability of Success (%)
Religious conflict		
Military intervention		
Support opposition		
1,000 casualties	18	
Nonmajor power		
From: Base		
To: Ethnic conflict	13	-5
From: Base		
To: Ideological conflict	12	-6
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention	8*	-10
From: Base		
To: Economic intervention	18	nil
From: Base		
To: Support government	46**	+28
From: Base		
To: Major power intervention	39**	+21
From: Base		
To: 990,000 casualties	3	-15

*p < .10. **p < .05.

into a low-casualty ideological, rather than religious, conflict, the probability of a successful outcome would be just 12 percent, a decline of 6 percent in the likelihood of stopping the fighting. Likewise, moving from the base conditions to an intervention on behalf of the government increases the probability of stopping

TABLE 4.3. Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Intervention on the Probability of Success, Model 2, General Category

Base	Probability of Success (%)	Change in Probability of Success (%)
Religious conflict		
Military intervention		
Support opposition		
1,000 casualties	12	
Nonmajor power		
From: Base		
To: Ethnic conflict	9	-3
From: Base		
To: Ideological conflict	8	-4
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention, support opposition	26	+14
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention, support government	17	+5
From: Base		
To: Military intervention, support government	49**	37
From: Base		
To: Economic intervention, support opposition	22	+10
From: Base		
To: Major power intervention	34**	+22
From: Base		
To: 990,000 casualties	1	-11

**p < .05.

the fighting by 28 percent (to 46%) over the same policy supporting the opposition. Major power interventions are also more likely to succeed under similar conditions.

Going back to the hypothetical case, one critique of the results might be that the real-life analogies did not have stopping the fighting as the goal of the interventions. In a sense, however, they did. Libya's preferred outcome was that the IRA would be successful at compelling British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. In part the results of my analysis would suggest that Libya could have increased the likelihood of their intervention succeeding by supporting the British government rather than the IRA. This is a nonsensical conclusion, because for political reasons Libya did not have such a choice. In other conflicts there does seem to be a choice of which side to support. France's reluctant intervention in the carnage of Rwanda in 1994 could have sided with either the Tutsi minority or the Hutu-led government at the time. To many observers it appeared that France was coming to the aid of its traditional ally, the Hutus, even though the Tutsi eventually prevailed in the conflict (Adelman and Shtrike 1996). As it stands, the French creation of a "safe haven" for the fleeing Hutus did contribute to the end of the fighting, at least for the short term. What this highlights, however, is the need to examine the interactive effects of potential intervention strategies.

Using the interactive model, Model 2, we get a broader range of results with a more-nuanced interpretation of the effect of various strategies of intervention on the outcome of the effort. For example, from Model 1 (table 4.2) we know that supporting the government increases the probability of success over a similar policy in support of the opposition, as does an intervention by a major power over that of a nonmajor intervenor. All of the other variations in the model lead to reductions in the probability of success over that obtained from the base situation. However, from Model 2 (table 4.3) we see that a number of strategies for intervening are actually better than a military intervention in support of the opposition. As with Model 1, supporting the government is generally more successful than supporting the opposition. A mixed intervention is more likely to be successful than the base conditions (in support of the government, 17%), even if the mixed intervention is in support of the opposition (26%). Economic support for the opposition increases the likelihood of success by 10 percent over military support for the same group. Keeping in mind that economic support for the opposition can be a result of economic sanctions placed on the government, it suggests that sanctions might be an effective tool for conflict resolution.

A few interesting results come out of this component of the analysis, some reasonably intuitive, some not. First, regardless of which model is chosen, varying the type of the conflict seems to matter little in the change in the likelihood of a successful intervention. Moving from a religious to an ideological conflict has the largest swing in the probability of success, declining 6 percent in Model 1 and 4 percent in Model 2, but in neither case do we have sufficient statistical confidence

in the strength of the identified relationship. Ethnic and religious conflicts seem to have about the same probability of success, all things being equal, and the level of statistical significance is such that we cannot tell these two types of conflicts apart anyway—at least in terms of the probability of an intervention stopping the fighting. Second, high-casualty conflicts are considerably more difficult to control than the low-casualty variety. In Model 1 the probability of success drops by 15 percent when moving from a conflict with 1,000 fatalities to one having nearly a million. In Model 2 the observed likelihood of success declines from 12 percent to 1 percent. Again, the caveat must be made at this juncture that our level of statistical confidence in some of these relationships is weak and inferences must be made accordingly, though this does not totally deflect our ability to draw inferences.

The low statistical confidence does not mean that the identified relationship is necessarily incorrect but suggests that as the level of confidence declines it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between the null model, of no systematic relationship, and the one identified in the analysis. For example, as the standard error (identified in tables 4.1 and 4.4) increases relative to the size of the coefficients, the probability that the coefficient is a result of a random process increases. Therefore, we have a difficult time determining whether the coefficient reflects a systematic relationship or a random event. The standard level of acceptance of the statistical significance of a coefficient is when the chance of the coefficient reflecting a random process is less than 1 in 20 (in general, the coefficient divided by the standard error is about 2.00—the T statistic). In Model 2, for example, the coefficient associated with the increase in the number of casualties is significant at the .20 level, meaning that there is a 1 in 5 chance that the identified coefficient is a result of chance alone. However, you can calculate the probability that the relationship operates in the direction identified by the sign of the coefficient *and* is different from zero by using a one-tailed test of significance. If we have enough confidence in this directional relationship, then we can be reasonably certain that the effect is in the direction identified, though the magnitude of that effect is in question. In the case of high-casualty conflicts, for instance, the degree of confidence that we have that the coefficient is negative and nonzero in Model 1 is about 85 percent and in Model 2, 90 percent. This suggests that with an 85 to 90 percent certainty, interventions into high-casualty conflicts are less likely to be successful than the same intervention into a low-casualty conflict. This may not meet conventional norms for judging the usefulness of identified empirical relationships, but it gives us considerably more information to operate under than simply arguing that the strength of the relationship is uncertain.³ Furthermore, given the crosscurrents by which the role of casualties seem to operate—on the one hand

³ The calculation for the one-tailed test is $\text{Prob } \beta > \beta_0 = Z = \beta - \beta_0 / \sigma\beta$.

increasing the pressures to intervene, and then subsequently decreasing the likelihood that the intervention will be successful—it suggests that policymakers face difficult choices in the more violent and visible conflicts.

The Intense Case

For the intense conflicts I apply the models used in the general case to the more narrowly defined group of conflicts already discussed. Table 4.4 displays the results of the statistical analysis. From the coefficients in both models, for instance, we can see that a religious conflict has a greater probability of success than either an

TABLE 4.4. Results of Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Intervention, Intense Category of Interventions, $N = 57$

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Ethnic conflict	-1.28 (1.15)	-1.27 (1.17)
Ideological conflict	-2.06* (1.13)	-2.08* (1.20)
Mixed intervention	1.03 (.82)	
Supporting government	.55 (.66)	
Casualties	-6.32 $\times 10^{-6}$ ** (2.82 $\times 10^{-6}$)	-6.37 $\times 10^{-6}$ ** (2.82 $\times 10^{-6}$)
Major power	1.12 (.76)	1.10 (.76)
Mixed support of government		1.71* (1.02)
Mixed support of opposition		1.07 (1.05)
Military support of government		.45 (.84)
Constant	.88 (1.24)	.93 (1.38)
Model 1: Log likelihood = -29.76 Chi square = 15.50, 6 degrees of freedom, $p < .01$	Model 2: Log likelihood = -29.53 Chi square = 15.96, 7 degrees of freedom, $p < .02$	

Note: There were no instances of purely economic interventions in intense conflicts; economic instruments were therefore left out of the analysis.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; numbers in () are standard errors.

ethnic or an ideological conflict, though given a level of statistical significance that is below the convention of .05 for ethnic conflicts, we need to be cautious about the inferences we draw. The number of casualties also seems to make a considerable difference in the outcome of the intervention, where moving from a low- (relatively speaking) casualty conflict to a high-casualty conflict decreases the prospects for a successful intervention, and here we have a high degree of statistical confidence in this result. These results also suggest that supporting the government is better than supporting the opposition, and that as the type of intervention moves from a military to a mixed strategy, the likelihood of success increases. The presentations in tables 4.5 and 4.6 give a more intuitive view of the effects of these variables on the outcome of intervention attempts. In table 4.5,

TABLE 4.5. Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Intervention on the Probability of Success, Model 1, Intense Category

Base	Probability of Success (%)	Change in Probability of Success (%)
Religious conflict		
Military intervention		
Support opposition		
10,000 casualties		
Nonmajor power	69	
From: Base		
To: Ethnic conflict	38	-31
From: Base		
To: Ideological conflict	22*	-47
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention	86	+17
From: Base		
To: Support government	79	+10
From: Base		
To: Major power intervention	87	+18
From: Base		
To: 990,000 casualties	1**	-69

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$.

for instance, the probability of a change from failure to success is displayed for a given change in a specific explanatory variable from the base. The hypothetical base used for comparative purposes is a conflict that is oriented around religious divisions, in which there have been 10,000 casualties, and that has had a military intervention by a nonmajor power in support of the opposition; the estimated probability of success of this intervention is 69 percent.

TABLE 4.6. Individual Effects of Changing Conditions for Intervention on the Probability of Success, Model 2, Intense Category

Base	Probability of Success (%)	Change in Probability of Success (%)
Religious conflict		
Military intervention		
Support opposition		
10,000 casualties		
Nonmajor power	70	
From: Base		
To: Ethnic conflict	40	-30
From: Base		
To: Ideological conflict	22*	-48
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention, support opposition	87	+17
From: Base		
To: Mixed intervention, support government	92	+22
From: Base		
To: Military intervention, support government	79	+9
From: Base		
To: Major power intervention	87	+17
From: Base		
To: 990,000 casualties	>1**	-70

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$.

This hypothetical case, again, is not entirely hypothetical in that it is consistent with a number of actual interventions, such as Libya's support for the opposition in the Sudanese civil war in 1983 and Syrian intervention into the Lebanese civil war, 1975–1988. Table 4.5 suggests that given the same conditions but having the intervention take place in an ideological conflict, for example, there would be a decrease in the probability of a successful intervention of 47 percent. A military intervention in support of the opposition in an ideological conflict of this intensity has only a 22 percent chance of success, given historical patterns. So supporting an insurgency with the goal of bringing the government to the negotiating table—or overthrowing it—is a policy with a slim chance of success. On the other hand, moving away from a sole reliance on military instruments to include economic tools increases the probability of success under base conditions from 69 percent to 86 percent, a 17 percent increase in the likelihood of success. The practical interpretation is that if you are going to support the opposition in a religious struggle, perhaps coupling military support with economic sanctions on the government is a much better strategy than just the military component alone. Furthermore, going from a conflict with 10,000 casualties to one approaching a million casualties virtually eliminates any hope of a successful outcome to the intervention.

Unfortunately in the real world, decision makers cannot hold “all else constant.” When evaluating options for designing a strategy of intervention, they can vary both the form of the intervention and its target. The estimation of Model 2 allows us to clarify somewhat the effect of varying the strategies for intervention when holding the characteristics of the conflict constant, more in line with the options faced by decision makers. Table 4.6 presents the results of the calculations of the probability of success derived from the interactive model, Model 2. The effect of the interactive model on the relationship between the characteristics of the conflict and successful outcomes is marginal. The probability at the base is slightly higher, and the effect of varying the type of conflict is imperceptible. Overall, however, the marginal effect of changes in the strategy for intervening do have a significantly different substantive interpretation from Model 2 than the results of Model 1. For instance, table 4.6 suggests that any strategy for intervention stands a greater chance of success than a military intervention in support of opposition forces, all things of course being equal. These increased probabilities of success range from 9 percent (military support for the government) to 22 percent (mixed support for the government). Furthermore, regardless of the target of the intervention, a mixed strategy has a considerably better chance of success than an intervention relying solely on military means. Through further calculations it can be shown that even the best strategy for intervening (mixed in support of the government) has a near-zero chance of success when the number of casualties approaches one million. The best strategy in an ideological conflict—mixed in sup-

port of the government—furthermore, has only a 40 percent chance of success, even when the number of casualties is at the low end of the spectrum. This compares with an 85 percent chance of a similar intervention policy being successful in religious conflicts. In both Models 1 and 2 a major power intervening has a considerably higher chance of bringing the fighting to an end than does a nonmajor power adopting the same strategy, though in neither case is the relationship statistically robust.

Discussion

The results of this component of the research project can be evaluated in two ways. The first is in light of the hypotheses laid out in the earlier part of this chapter, which will contribute to our understanding of conflict processes and conflict resolution. The second is in terms of what it tells the policy community grappling with the tricky questions of where and how to intervene. These two realms of understanding are of course intertwined, though to some degree they demand a slightly different focus in terms of inferences and interpretations. Both will get their hearing in this section.

Before focusing on the specific results of the hypotheses outlined earlier, some broad observations about the differences between the intense and the general cases should be explored. These differences can be quite extreme and lead to inferences that are revealing. First, the probability of success at the base conditions—to some degree the easiest case—is much greater in the intense conflicts than in the general category. For example, an intervention in an intense conflict at the base conditions has a 69 percent chance of success, yet the same intervention evaluated across the broader sample of cases has only an 18 percent probability of success. Second, the combatants' identity characteristics play a significantly greater role in determining the success of an intervention in the intense conflicts. Third, the role of a mixed intervention is much clearer in the intense conflict than in the broader population of cases. Support for the government and the power status of the intervenor have virtually the same impact across the intensity divide, and in each instance the effect of high-casualty conflicts is to reduce the probability of success to near zero, though the change in probability of success in the intense conflict is considerably more dramatic.

The different probabilities of a successful intervention at the base line between the intense and general categories serves as a useful point of comparison—and is quite remarkable in its range. This 50 percent increase in the likelihood of observing a successful intervention when the minimum threshold for the intensity is raised to 10,000 casualties per year suggests that something significant happens when the level of slaughter is extreme. The 10,000 fatality threshold requires that,

on average, the conflict results in about 850 casualties per month over the course of a year and sustains this for the length of the conflict. Given that at the peak of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (January through May 1968) the United States was taking casualties at a rate just twice of this figure, averaging 10,000 fatalities per year reflects a considerably hostile conflict (see Gartner and Segura 1998 for data). Interestingly enough, these are also the types of conflicts where decision makers have the most difficulty in conceiving of implementing a successful policy; that is, there is a marked decrease in the probability of observing an intervention in the first place (see chapter 3). So what is going on that leads to the most difficult cases being the most tractable and responsive to outside interventions?

We might think about this in two ways. The first is that the intensity of a conflict is difficult to sustain, and many of the interventions are of sufficient magnitude to affect the course of the conflict. In essence the intervenors do not go into the conflict lightly, and they display considerable resolve. Because the combatants cannot sustain the level of intensity, the outside intervention acts as the catalyst that helps bring the fighting to a halt—even if only temporarily. The second way to think about the effectiveness of interventions in these intense conflicts is that they are more likely to reach the hurting stalemate that some see as a necessary condition for resolution, and that the role of the intervention serves to rapidly shift the phase of the conflict (Kriesberg 1992) and contributes to the ripeness for resolution (Haass 1990).

Based on the reasoning behind an intervention that I articulated previously, where the intervenor is trying to influence the cost-benefit calculations and the expectations of the combatants, five hypotheses were specified. On the whole there is considerable support for the arguments that were put forth, though exceptions are notable and need to be explained. The results, furthermore, are considerably stronger for the more narrowly defined intense conflict than for the general case. For example, reflecting on hypothesis 4, which is possibly the easiest hypothesis to deal with, regardless of the definition of the cases or the model used to test the proposition, high-casualty conflicts have a lower probability of successful interventions than conflicts without the extreme killing. This is a reasonably intuitive result. In the intense category of cases, the upper limit for conflict casualties (990,000) has a near nil chance of a third party intervening and successfully stopping the carnage under a fixed set of conditions; a high-casualty conflict in the general category of cases still results in the lowest probability of a successful intervention. As we will see shortly, even under the best of conditions high-casualty conflicts do not lend themselves to outside interventions if the goal is to stop the fighting.

Overall, mixed strategies for intervening tend to be more successful than any single focused efforts—supporting hypothesis 1—though this is not universal across all specifications. In the intense category of cases, a mixed intervention

always has a higher probability of a successful outcome than a sole reliance on military instruments. The minimum increase in the likelihood of observing a successful outcome when employing a mixed strategy is 22 percent over a purely military intervention. In the general category of cases, a mixed intervention has a mixed relationship to successful outcomes. In the additive model, Model 1, a mixed intervention is slightly less likely to be successful than a military effort, while in the interactive model, Model 2, the results get slightly more complex. A mixed strategy is always better than the base conditions—military support for the opposition—but a mixed strategy does not always get to the highest probability of success. It seems that the interaction between the instruments for intervening and the target has a discernible effect on the likely outcome. Military support for the government, for instance, has the highest probability of success, followed by a mixed intervention in support of the opposition. The evaluation of hypothesis 1, therefore, must look something like qualified support.

There is overwhelming support for the notion that ideological conflicts are less amenable to outside interventions (hypothesis 2), though under the general model our confidence in the strength of that relationship is weaker than we would like. This evidence would seem to counter the well-regarded speculations of Kaufmann (1996), who suggested that intense ethnic conflicts would be least susceptible to outside interventions. Likewise, major power interventions seem to have a higher probability of success than the same intervention by a nonmajor power. Support for the government tends to be more successful than supporting the opposition, though again, in the interactive models we see that this conclusion must be qualified based on the method of intervening. Given the framing of the outcome in terms of successfully stopping the fighting for a minimum of six months, the results seem reasonably well in tune with the theoretical logic that posits that interventions attempt to alter the perceptions and calculations of the respective antagonists. To stop the fighting, both sides must hold reasonable expectations that the intervention will lead the opposing side to calculate that an end to the fighting is in its interest; it is the intervenor's job to determine the policies that will have the greatest impact on the deliberations of the combatants. But what does all this contribute to the decision-making process unfolding in the secluded corridors of the White House, the Palace, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Policy-Relevant Implications

When designing strategies for intervening into civil conflicts, decision makers face hurdles associated with uncertainty—uncertainty over what works under which types of conditions. Most prescriptive analyses rely on a relatively small number of “similar” cases from which to draw analogies for future policies (Dortman and

Orte 1995; Kanter and Brooks 1994; and Neustadt and May 1986 for the operative logic). We know, however, from the relative frequency with which intervention policies fail that the analogical method by itself has severe shortcomings, shortcomings that could be mitigated by attention to trends developed over a large number of cases and a considerable length of time. At the end of the day the results of this analysis should be judged by what they tell us about the decision to intervene in intrastate conflicts, particularly those conflicts that often create the most difficult decisions for policymakers. A few points stand out that should give cause for decision makers to pay attention to the trends identified. A word of prudence to the policymaker is appropriate.

Just as a good argument can be made that a sole reliance on the most analogous case can be a prescription for disaster, so too can one be made about the sole reliance on statistical trends. The relationships between strategies for intervening and subsequent outcomes should be considered as a blueprint from which to begin the decision-making process rather than the Rosetta stone that might dictate the policy of choice. Even if used in broad brush strokes to identify those strategies and conditions under which interventions are highly likely to fail, this analysis could make a substantial contribution to the deliberative process. I would suggest, however, that this analysis be used in conjunction with good solid political reasoning, the incorporation of ethical considerations, and an understanding of the history and context into which the intervention is being considered. Used in this manner, "successful" policies would more likely be the norm.

With this in mind, the results point to a number of policy considerations. First, the difference in strength and direction of the results across the categories of cases would suggest that at minimum the intervention process plays out differently across some threshold of intensity, and that in designing policies this characteristic of the conflict should be factored into the evaluation of alternatives. Second, and more important, when the conflict involves large numbers of fatalities, such as those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, characteristics of the conflict itself can play a substantial role in determining the outcome of the intervention attempt. Decision makers should pay attention to who is fighting and how bloody the conflict has been as they consider alternatives. This prescription might simply be a confirmation of what intuition tells us, but as we saw in chapter 3 certain aspects of these particularly bloody conflicts push toward interventions on humanitarian grounds. The general reluctance of any state to intervene in Rwanda in April 1994 reflects this notion that the perception that success is difficult to achieve when the level of hostility is extremely high. In general, ethnic or religious conflicts are more amenable to outside interventions than are ideological conflicts, and it is easier to stop the fighting when the total number of fatalities is at the low end of the spectrum—even though that low end may already constitute a large number of casualties. If the number of fatalities reaches upwards of a million, the chances of using

military or economic instruments to bring a halt to the fighting are minusculely low, leading to the conclusion that any proposed intervention might best be tabled if something akin to stopping the fighting is the objective.

Although it is most often politics that drives decisions to intervene in ideological conflicts, using the results of Model 2 in the general case we can determine that there is a 71 percent chance of successfully bringing the fighting to an end if the intervention is carried out by a major power, is a military intervention supporting the government, and the number of casualties are low. Under the worst conditions, interventions into ideological conflicts are almost certain to be failures (high casualties, minor power, and military intervention supporting the opposition), having only a 1 percent chance of success. This poor record in these types of conflicts could be tied to two factors: (1) the intractability of the issues at stake in ideological conflicts, and (2) the frequency with which interventions in ideological conflicts lead to counterinterventions by the intervenors' ideological foe. Although the tendency for interventions to exacerbate ideological conflicts cannot be clearly discerned at this juncture, some evidence supports this interpretation (chapter 2).

If a state chooses to intervene in an ideological conflict that is quite violent, it should do so knowing that the chances of either propelling one side to victory or compelling one or both sides to cease fire and come to the bargaining table are rather small. Intervening under these conditions, therefore, is more likely to exacerbate than settle the conflict. During the cold war there are numerous examples of interventions in ideological conflicts that seemed to at best fan the flames of the struggle. In Nicaragua and El Salvador these difficulties are most evident. The Nicaraguan war was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union, with Americans arming and funding the contra movement trying to overthrow the Sandinista government, which was supplied with weapons and money by the Soviets. Both sides were sufficiently supported to ensure a military stalemate, but the political demands were nothing short of dissolution of the opponent. The conflict continued because political compromise was unacceptable and military victory was unachievable. It took the cooling of the cold war to allow for a relaxation of patron support and the eventual development of political alternatives.

Tentative answers to the puzzling questions faced by decision makers as to how to intervene, and on behalf of whom, can be found in this analysis. In general, a mixed strategy is most often the more successful method of intervening, but this is tempered somewhat by the target of choice. It would seem from the evidence that overall support for the government is the best bet. What is unclear from this analysis—but clearly should be a topic for future research—is the relative effect of different mixes of "carrots and sticks."

The policy implications of this work are also immediate and can be applied to contemporary situations. For example, the Bosnian conflict has figured promi-

nently in global affairs for the past few years, with substantial efforts to control the fighting undertaken by various individual states and multilateral organizations. Up until the interventions that evolved from the Dayton Peace Accords, all of these previous attempts to bring a halt to the fighting were largely unsuccessful. The results of this analysis point to some of the reasons why. First, the number of casualties was substantial—by some estimates upwards of a quarter of a million—which greatly diminished the likelihood of a successful outcome. Second, for the most part the interventions relied primarily on military means. Food aid was provided to the civilian populations, where possible, but this was more an attempt to minimize the trauma of the war than to alter the calculations of the combatants, and therefore not targeted at authority structures. And, finally, most interventions were decidedly neutral, so as to not appear to be siding with the positions of any of the combatants. The tide really changed in the war when NATO sanctioned the use of military strikes against Bosnian-Serb positions in response to the shelling of Sarajevo. The United States was largely responsible for carrying out the retaliatory strikes, and the practical effect was to stop the shelling of the city and increase the tempo of attempts to negotiate a settlement.

At the time of this writing the outcome of the post-Dayton intervention into Bosnia was still in limbo, yet the results of this study give reason to be optimistic about the effort to bring stability to the region. The intervention itself was composed of nearly 60,000 troops deployed in such a way as to separate the warring factions. And although on the surface the NATO troops attempted to be neutral, the initial phase of the intervention appeared much more heavily weighted against the Bosnian-Serbs. The overwhelming military capability of the troop deployment by NATO⁴ may have been sufficient to blunt the fighting, but as it was, the military component of the intervention was coupled with a substantial redevelopment package amounting to tens of millions of dollars. Given the conditions of the conflict and the mixed intervention strategy largely favoring the Bosnian government, my analysis predicts a 77 percent probability of successfully halting the fighting. The large number of casualties works against a successful outcome, but the combination of military force and economic redevelopment aid substantially increases the chance of success over previous policies. Had the economic redevelopment money not been part of the intervention package, my analysis suggests that the probability of success would be reduced by 8 percent. As it stands today (1999) the fighting in Bosnia has largely stopped, and what exists is a divided society occupied by a large number of outside soldiers. The political and social rebuilding remains fragile, but the necessary first step of a halt to the fighting has been achieved. Talk of outside interventions into the neighboring conflict in Kosovo began in late 1998 but

never materialized until mid-1999. Led by the United States and Britain, NATO intervened militarily in support of the Albanian opposition's struggle against the Serbs. Initially the bombing, coupled with a large occupation force, appears to have halted the fighting, though by September 1999 it is still too early to tell if the intervention is sufficient to effectively stop the fighting for six months. If it does it will have beaten the odds as determined by the results in table 4.3.

Overall, the theoretical framework in combination with the empirical analysis can be quite compelling. There does appear to be consistent empirical trends across a large number of cases that can be used to guide the policy process. These trends suggest that both the characteristics of the conflict and the design of the intervention strategy influence the outcome of the policy—at least if the intervention is carried out unilaterally and the assumed goal is to bring a halt to the fighting. These two limiting criteria, however, do not always hold. Since the end of the cold war the world has witnessed an increasing reliance on collective efforts to intervene between the combatants in internal conflicts. At times the expressed goal of these collective interventions is to stop the fighting, but just as often the goals are broadened to include a more comprehensive settlement of the dispute (Damrosch 1993). The following chapter will attempt to expand the conceptual domain by which we can understand multilateral interventions into civil conflicts and begin to take up the challenge of articulating the conditions for interventions in this post-cold war environment.

⁴ There are troops from non-NATO countries—for example, Russia has more than 1,000 troops deployed—but NATO countries contributed the bulk of these forces.