# Arms as Influence

## THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE

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One justification for U.S. arms transfers is that the United States can manipulate its arms exports to make the recipients of American aid comply with American wishes. This article explores the conditions under which such arms influence attempts succeed. Sixteen potential determinants are discussed, drawn from the attributes of the influence attempt, the recipient, the interaction of the recipient and supplier, the supplier, and the systemic environment. A data set of 191 American arms influence attempts from 1950 to 1992 is presented. Using logit analysis, the variables are tested against the outcome—success or failure—of the influence attempt. Successful influence attempts are more likely when the United States used promises or rewards, focused on altering the recipient's foreign policy, made the attempt on civilian regimes, supplied more of the recipient's arms, and made attempts in the first half of the cold war era, when the United States was generally more powerful.

One justification for U.S. arms transfers is that the United States can manipulate its arms exports to make the recipient of American aid comply with American wishes (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] 1975; Pierre 1982). This phenomenon is termed influence or leverage. Although there is a consensus among arms trade scholars that the United States does attempt to influence recipients, a vigorous debate remains about how well such practices work—if they work at all (Sylvan 1978). For each example of the United States successfully influencing a recipient's behavior, there is another example in which the influence attempt had no impact or even worsened relations between the two nations. Two examples illustrate

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this intermittent success: efforts to end the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the 1975 arms embargo against Turkey.

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptians launched a surprise invasion of Israel, realizing significant early gains. The Israelis rallied, however, and on October 16 crossed the canal into Egypt. By October 22, the Israelis were threatening to encircle the Third Egyptian Army. In an effort to end the war, President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger promised the Israelis continued military assistance even after the war if they accepted a cease-fire. But more important, they threatened to cut back aid if a halt in the fighting did not occur (Pollock 1982, 176). Although the Israeli cabinet accepted the cease-fire on October 22, Israeli advances continued along the southern front for 3 more days. The United States was troubled by these actions and now threatened that all future aid would be made contingent on Israel adhering to the cease-fire. This threat was sufficient for the Israelis, who did just that (Pollock 1982, 177-9).

The American arms embargo against Turkey after its invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, was less successful. After the invasion, Congress proposed cutting military aid as a means of facilitating negotiations on the Cyprus issue. A clear showing of American displeasure would get the Turks to the table, and with a more conciliatory tone.[1] However, President Ford and Kissinger initiated a sustained effort to block an arms embargo, believing that it would do little to facilitate negotiations.[2] Legislation establishing an arms embargo effective February 5, 1975, was reluctantly signed by Ford. The consequences of the embargo appeared to confirm the administration's fears. After its implementation, U.S.-Turkish relations were severely strained, U.S. facilities on Turkey were closed or their activities restricted, and Turkey's role in NATO, and NATO forces overall, were weakened. Discussions over Cyprus did not advance (Campany 1986).

Although it is clear that arms influence attempts happen, it is not clear when they succeed and why, raising the question of just what determines an influence attempt's success. Answering this question requires an examination of the environment in which the influence attempt occurs. This context varies for each attempt. It seems plausible that the context in which the attempt occurs facilitates or hinders the success of the influence attempt. As a first step toward a better understanding of the arms-influence relationship, this article clarifies the nature of the relationship and the conditions under which influence attempts are more likely to succeed. This discussion should spur

1. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* Vol. 32, no. 42, October 19, 1974, p. 2903.

2. See, for example, "President Ford Vetoes Two Versions of Bill Restricting Aid to Turkey," *Department of State Bulletin* Vol. 71, no. 1846 (November 11, 1974), p. 655.

the investigation into why these attempts succeed. In the process, the notion of influence—at least as it is applied to military statecraft—may be further refined—a step considered overdue (Krause 1991; Sylvan 1978).

To answer the question of when arms influence attempts succeed, the article proceeds in four main parts: (1) The concept *arms influence attempt* is defined, (2) intervening variables that affect successful influence are proposed, (3) a data set of American arms-influence attempts is created, and (4) a logit analysis of the potential determinants of successful influence is conducted. The results suggest that multiple factors have an impact on the arms as influence process—sometimes facilitating successful influence; at other times hindering that outcome.

## ARMS AS INFLUENCE: A FRAMEWORK

Wheelock (1978) defines leverage or influence as the "manipulation of the arms transfer relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient-state to conform its policy or actions to the desires of the supplier-state" (p. 123). This definition suggests that three sequential aspects constitute an arms-influence process: Initially, the arms recipient behaves in a way undesired by an arms supplier, who subsequently manipulates its arms exports to try to force the recipient to alter its policy, resulting in some outcome.

In their actions and responses, suppliers and recipients are assumed to be rational actors. Initially, the recipient is engaged in some behavior, which the supplier does not desire. The recipient obtains more value by noncompliance with the supplier than by compliance. The supplier prefers that the recipient change its behavior in line with the supplier's wishes, because the supplier expects to receive more value if the recipient does this. Thus there is an inherent dilemma: The recipient does not want to change while the supplier does not want the status quo. This is evident in the differing American and Israeli stances on the cease-fire, and American and Turkish positions on negotiations, noted above.

The supplier then initiates an influence attempt. That decision follows from the supplier's belief that an alternative to the recipient's current behavior exists, which would net the supplier more utility than the recipient's present course of behavior. The supplier also considers the costs and benefits of attempting to influence the recipient and the probabilities of success and failure.[3] (I

3. That the supplier has made an influence attempt implies that it has considered counterleverage of the recipient. The supplier would believe that the potential benefits outweigh any recipient retaliation that might come from the recipient's strategic importance to the supplier, for example.

assume in this article that such an attempt has occurred because the concern here is with the recipient's reaction.) The supplier selects the influence mechanism from a diverse menu of arms export policies including the actual weapons and the means by which they are transferred.

The manipulation takes the form of either positive sanctions, which are rewards, actual or promised; or negative sanctions, which are threats or punishments. Examples of the former include President Reagan's pledge that if the Philippine elections of 1986 were fair and the winner promised to initiate reforms, he would ask Congress to allocate increased military assistance, and the American exchange of $40 million in military aid for access to facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia in 1980. Examples of the latter include Reagan's 1986 threat to cut off American military aid if any violence occurred in the Philippines after President Marcos was inaugurated on the heels of fraudulent elections, and the suspension of military aid to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.[4]

The recipient's reaction to an influence attempt is conditional; compliance or noncompliance is determined by the nature of the attempt and a subsequent comparison of the costs and benefits of the recipient's two courses of action: staying the course or altering policy in light of an influence attempt. The recipient attempts to select the policy alternative that maximizes its expected net benefits, and it shifts from noncompliance to compliance only when the result is a net increase in benefits, because the expected utility of the influence attempt tipped the scales.

The recipient's decision calculus consists of three parts. The recipient considers the benefits and costs resulting from a shift between compliance and noncompliance, the benefits and costs of the instrument of influence being applied upon it, and the probability that it will actually incur the benefits or costs of the instrument of influence—because threats and promises need not be carried out. An illustration of this stage of the arms influence process concerns the threatened aid suspension to Pakistan in 1977.

In 1977, the United States threatened to cut off military aid to Pakistan under the Symington-Glenn amendment, which prohibited aid to countries engaged in nuclear proliferation, if Pakistan went ahead and obtained a French nuclear reprocessing plant. Pakistan faced essentially two choices: It could pursue the reactor and go against American wishes or abandon the project in favor of American preferences. Initially, the Pakistanis

4. These examples, as is the focus of this study, are on short-term attempts at influence. Short-term attempts are considered to be the strongest, clearest, and most direct (Krause 1991). They may also be the most frequent.

preferred to acquire the reactor, because they felt that the value received through noncompliance was greater than the value achieved through compliance.

The loss of American military aid would clearly be a cost for the Pakistanis. They then had to consider the value of obtaining the reactor but losing American military aid (the threat) versus the value of not obtaining the reactor and keeping U.S. assistance (compliance). If the costs of the cut off are very high or if the difference between compliance and noncompliance is small, the threat might succeed in making compliance more attractive than noncompliance.

Even if the Pakistani leadership could clearly attach value to all these actions, it must also wonder whether or not the threat is credible. Possibly the Americans were bluffing. Then the Pakistanis should not take the threat into account, and obtaining the reactor remains the best move. In the end, the Pakistanis had to consider the value of compliance (not getting the reactor/keeping U.S. aid) against the utility of noncompliance (getting the reactor) with the punishment (loss of U.S. aid) coupled with the probability that the punishment would be meted out.[5]

## THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE

The supplier seeks to change the attractiveness of compliance and noncompliance by manipulating its arms exports. Arms-influence attempts are more likely to succeed when the difference between the recipient's utility for compliance and noncompliance is small or the utility of the influence technique is large. The potential determinants of successful influence are those elements that may affect these utilities. Numerous factors that may affect the likelihood of success of an arms-influence attempt are suggested in the literature on the arms trade. However, previous research has failed to identify which of these factors are most relevant. The task in this section is to bring together these elements and identify those which may explain successful influence attempts and should be further explored from a larger universe of plausible explanatory variables. Sixteen variables are considered, organized into five categories.[6]

5. Credibility also means that the supplier will act only when it has pledged to; for example, Pakistan expects to be punished for only noncompliance and not if it complies.

6. This set of categories is adapted from Peter Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, no. 3 (1968), pp. 248-67.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TECHNIQUE

The first category concerns the mechanism of the influence attempt. It seems likely that the nature of the arms-influence attempt itself somehow contributes to its success or failure.

*Sanction type*. One characteristic is the type of sanction employed: positive or negative. Although research has associated both carrots and sticks with successful influence attempt outcomes (Gelb 1976-1977; Wheelock 1978; Quandt 1978), it is hypothesized here that positive sanctions are more likely to yield success. Punishments and threats are weakened by alternate suppliers and indigenous arms production (Klare 1983; Peleg 1980; Rosh 1990), whereas promises and rewards may be less elastic.

*Deterrence*. Whether the supplier is trying to deter or compel the recipient is a second potential element. Scholars have asserted that deterrent efforts, focusing on preventing some future undesired behavior, may be more likely to succeed (Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Quandt 1978). This may be because the recipient incurs less cost in maintaining the status quo than in changing it.

*Policy type*. A final characteristic of influence attempts concerns whether they seek to change the foreign or domestic policy of the recipient. Nations seem to be more resistant toward coercive efforts the more vital they find the interests at stake (Levite and Platias 1983). The domestic policies that America has attempted to alter, such as attempting to force leaders of coups to return power to the preceding government or attempting to coerce democratic reforms, seem more vital and thus harder to accomplish.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECIPIENT

Attributes of the recipient help shape the perceptions of the recipient state toward the influence attempt and thus affect how the recipient will respond. Internal differences are important: $50 million meant little to the Turks in 1979, who would not reopen U.S. bases, whereas $40 million meant a lot to the Somalis in 1980, who granted American access to military facilities in exchange. These outcomes occurred in part because Turkey's perception of the influence attempt differed from Somalia's, and those different perceptions occurred because the countries were different.

*Regime type*. Regimes can be classified as military and civilian. Military regimes may desire arms for more reasons than civilian regimes: Military regimes have a greater reliance on the use of force to remain in power or to legitimize their role as leaders (Maniruzzaman 1992), arms are a tangible symbol of their power and prestige (Brzoska 1989), or arms are the result of military elites' priorities in resource allocation (Zuk and Thompson 1982). Through this desire, military regimes may be more vulnerable to influence attempts.[7]

*International conflict.* Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies suggest that nations engaged in international war seek more arms (Neuman 1986; Pearson 1988). Recipients who perceive arms as more important may make themselves more vulnerable to influence attempts.[8]

*Security threats.* Additionally, current or future security threats might make a recipient desire greater amounts of arms and thus make it more vulnerable to influence attempts. Recipients fearing others' intentions do seem to react to increases in other states' capabilities (Mintz 1986a; Snider 1978).

*Civil strife.* Domestic strife may also increase the probability of successful influence attempts. Such a relationship is suggested when the government believes it needs weapons to control its population. Civil strife may cause recipients to desire more arms to cope with the conflict or to deter future conflict (Avery 1978; Pearson 1988).[9] That need may become a vulnerability in the face of a concurrent arms influence attempt.[10]

7. Obviously, civilian regimes may similarly seek to acquire arms for a variety of reasons as well. Zuk and Thompson (1982) found that the growth in military spending of military regimes is similar to other types of regimes. For all types of regimes, budgetary allocations to defense were declining over the 1967-1976 period, suggesting that military regimes did not care about defense sufficiently more than other types of regimes and so insulated this area of spending. More specifically, Pearson (1988) notes that only 6 of the top 20 arms importers possessed military governments, suggesting that both military and nonmilitary elites thought that arms were an important commodity.

8. However, Harkavy (1985) notes that suppliers may not want to try to influence recipients during combat, lest it impact negatively on the outcome of the war. Therefore, suppliers may be least willing to attempt influence precisely when it is most likely to succeed.

9. However, Avery's analysis of Latin American arms importers suggests that civil strife is not a significant factor in arms importation. If this is the case, then it seems unlikely that such strife makes recipients more dependent on arms suppliers.

10. The counterargument is that the recipient uses the foreign intervention as a rallying point and toughens its posture vis-à-vis the arms supplier: Backing down would be a sign of weakness, which would only fuel the instability. Moreover, if the United States fears the consequences of the civil strife, it may not attempt to influence the regime for fear of making things worse. As with conflict, the United States may not make an attempt at the time when it has the greatest chance of succeeding.

*Resources*. The recipient's defense allocations may have an impact on the outcome of an arms influence attempt. An American arms embargo, for example, creates a sudden gap between demand and supply. It is suggested that poorer recipients will not be able to compensate for the loss either by purchasing arms from other suppliers or through indigenous defense industry (Pearson 1988). As a result, poorer nations should be more susceptible to arms influence attempts.

*Indigenous arms production*. A second economic aspect that may affect the outcome of the supplier's influence efforts is whether or not the recipient possesses domestic arms production capabilities. Lacking such industry makes the recipient dependent on suppliers to provide, minimally, for their defense (Catrina 1988). The consequence of this dependence is that the suppliers may manipulate the supply relationship to attempt to alter recipient policy (Ross 1988). Conversely, nations with indigenous military industry may be less affected by punishments such as arms embargoes and less swayed by rewards because they too can produce such goods.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECIPIENT-SUPPLIER INTERACTION

*Supplier arms dependence*. One proposition suggests that a supplier can tie a recipient to the supplier's arms through its arms export policy (Catrina 1988). Today's weapons are somewhat unique to the supplier. Moreover, the supplier may train the state's army, provide a military strategy calling for certain arms, and provide those weapons (Kemp 1979). As this arms dependence increases, the recipient should become more vulnerable to influence attempts from that supplier.

*Trade dependence*. A second variable rests on the idea that the more dependence the recipient has in general on the supplier, the more likely the supplier's influence attempts will succeed. In many cases, the recipient and supplier are engaged in a number of relations (e.g., economic), of which only one is the arms relationship. The recipient may fear the supplier will link these other relations to the influence attempt so that, for example, a recipient may fear that if it does not respond to a supplier's threats, other relations between the two countries would be jeopardized. If other types of relations are important to the recipient, and the recipient fears issue linkage by the supplier, the supplier may be able to exert influence on the recipient.

*Precedent.* A final interaction between supplier and recipient that may affect the outcome of a supplier's influence attempt is of a more temporal nature. The United States has employed influence attempts more than once on the same recipient, as in the U.S.-Israeli relationship; or more than once on the same issue, as in the U.S.-Ecuadoran fishing dispute (in 1968 and 1971). Past attempts might affect the outcome of a current attempt (Blechman and Kaplan 1978). Precedent can set a pattern to which actors default: If a past threat was a bluff, a current threat is likely to be viewed similarly (Schelling 1980). Therefore, past successes may be more likely to be repeated, as will past failures.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUPPLIER

*Supplier unity.* American arms transfers reflect the division of powers and the checks and balances system (Burke 1989; Husbands 1979). As in the Turkish embargo, we should not always expect all the relevant parts of government to support an arms influence attempt from initiation through implementation. When the government is divided or the leadership appears weak or indecisive, the recipient is less likely to think that influence attempts will last (e.g., with punishments) or be implemented (e.g., with threats). Conversely, unity and firmness make influence attempts seem more credible and thus more likely to succeed (George 1991).

*Presidential style.* The president may also affect the outcome of an influence attempt (Blechman and Kaplan 1978). The idea behind this position is that presidents have a certain style that is translated into presidential power and subsequently into policy outcomes (Wegge 1981). Among Barber's (1992) classification of personality traits, active-positive presidents, who bring a lot of energy to, and obtain much personal satisfaction from, the job seem likely to have more power. Thus influence attempts made during their presidencies will be more likely to succeed.[11]

11. However, Blechman and Kaplan's analysis of presidential popularity and the use of force as an influence mechanism does not clearly support this position. They find that successful outcomes occurred most when the president had the lowest popularity, suggesting this might be because foreign actors believed the president was most committed or desperate. Successful outcomes occurred second most often when the president had the highest popularity, suggesting that foreign actors felt the president's actions were credible here too.

**SYSTEMIC VARIABLES**

The international system is the focus of the final set of factors affecting the success of influence attempts.[12]

*Hegemony.* The United States emerged from World War II as the world hegemon, but that position began to falter beginning in the late Vietnam era (McCormick 1989). This decline is evident in two arms policy shifts that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s: Arms were used less to forge commitments and more to maintain them (Harkavy 1979), and grant aid decreased in favor of sales. The greater power of the United States in the first half of the postwar era should result in greater successes in its foreign policy, including arms influence attempts.[13]

*Superpower relations.* A second systemic characteristic was the order imposed on the postwar world system by the Soviet-American rivalry. This rivalry found its way into arms exports (Kinsella forthcoming; Mintz 1986b). In exchange for arms, the superpowers expected loyalty from their clients (Ross 1988). However enduring the rivalry, the competition has not been static, and fluctuations in American-Soviet competition may affect the outcome of American influence attempts (Blechman and Kaplan 1978). Increased superpower competition may allow a recipient to play off one arms supplier against another. The consequence is that as competition decreases, the recipient's dependence increases as does the likelihood of success.[14]

## AMERICAN ARMS INFLUENCE ATTEMPTS

Studies that identify cases of American arms-influence attempts over a small time period (e.g., Sorley 1983) or that focus on one recipient over a

12. Although the size of the arms market or the number of alternate suppliers is thought to be a relevant attribute of the world system, it is not considered here. The best way to operationally define the concept is to consider to whom a recipient is most likely to turn if the United States manipulated its arms exports. SIPRI data best capture this theme. However, the data are also used to determine the degree of dependence the recipient has on the United States as an arms supplier. The two measures are necessarily strongly negatively correlated, to the degree that they cannot both be accurately analyzed in the same multivariate equation. See Sislin (1993) for a discussion of the impact of alternate suppliers on the outcome of an influence attempt.

13. This factor is more of a necessary condition, rather than a sufficient one: Power gives one a general advantage, and loss of power a general disadvantage, in making effective foreign policy.

14. A possible counterargument is that increased competition increases dependence as the superpowers draw their clients in. Cooperative periods are marked by increased tolerance on the part of the superpowers toward alternate recipient arms purchases.

longer time period (e.g., Pollock 1982) do not provide enough variance to test all the independent variables. Statistical analyses (e.g., Schrodt 1983) employing broad measures of arms sales, such as the annual monetary value of American sales, also are inadequate here: Although such approaches contain many cases of influence attempts, the attempts are lost among all the other arms processes included in the measurement. A different approach is required. The analysis in this article relies on a new data set that attempts to keep as much detail as possible, while also identifying a sufficiently large number of cases for rigorous statistical testing.

The United States was selected for the empirical analysis for three reasons: (1) It is one of the two largest suppliers of arms to the world; (2) one reason that it offers military assistance is to influence the recipient; and (3) the data on United States military assistance are the best available relative to other suppliers. The temporal focus is on the post-World War II period when arms transfers moved primarily under the aegis of government policy and when arms transfers became a regular, important aspect of U.S. foreign policy (Gerner 1983).

The first step in creating the data set is to identify cases where the United States attempted to influence a recipient by manipulating American arms export policy. Three bodies of literature were searched for cases of American influence attempts: governmental sources, including *The Department of State Bulletin*, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, congressional hearings, and memoirs of administration officials; public sources, including *The New York Times*, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, and *Facts on File*; and secondary sources, including books and articles that included influence attempts as illustrations. The search yielded 191 cases of American arms influence attempts from 1950 to 1992 (see the appendix).

The next task is to identify the outcome of those attempts. The outcome is defined in terms of success or failure. A successful outcome must imply both that the recipient altered its behavior more in line with U.S. preferences and that this happened because of the arms influence attempt. The outcome was determined by examining the information gathered on that case. Finally, each of the potential determinants of successful influence identified above was operationally defined and measured (see Sislin 1993 for elaboration). The sources for measuring these variables are briefly described below.

## DATA

Three variables concern attributes of the attempt. All were dichotomous with all cases coded. The source for all three was Sislin (1993). The sanction variable measures whether the influence attempt was a positive sanction, occurring 68 times, or a negative one, occurring 123 times. The deterrence variable measures whether the goal of the influence attempt was to deter (in 50 cases) or compel (in 141 cases) the recipient. The policy variable measures whether the influence attempt was focused on the recipient's foreign (113 cases) or domestic policy (78 cases).

Concerning the recipient, the regime variable measures whether the influence attempt was made on a regime that was military or civilian in nature. Banks (1975) identifies four types of regimes: military-civilian, military, civilian, and other. I combined the first two as military, and the second two as civilian. Data for the years from 1950 to 1982 are from Gurr (1990) and updated (Hunter 1992; Sislin 1993). Fifty-two attempts were made on military regimes and 139 on civilian regimes, with no missing data.

The conflict variable measures the presence or absence of international war involvement by the recipient during the influence attempt, as defined in the Correlates of War project (Singer 1991). Recipients were at war 41 times during attempts and at peace 135 times, with 15 missing cases. The security variable measures the degree of insecurity felt by the recipient during the influence attempt. I employed the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) to measure this variable (Azar 1982). The measure is the weighted sum of cooperation/conflict (Azar and Havener 1976) of each military event targeted on the recipient annually, divided by the number of events, to obtain a measure of annual average conflict, with 58 missing cases. The civil variable measures the presence or absence of civil strife in the recipient's country. Here, I define civil strife as civil war and use the Correlates of War data set on civil wars (Singer 1991). The broad temporal and spatial coverage of this data set must be weighed against the trade-off that civil war is only one form of civil strife. Strife was present in 28 cases and absent in 148 cases, with 15 cases missing.

The resource variable measures the wealth of a recipient in terms of gross domestic product per capita in 1980 U.S. dollars. Data were available for the years from 1950 to 1985 (Taylor and Amm 1993), with 148 missing cases. The indig.ap variable measures the absence or presence of indigenous arms production capabilities by the recipient, as measured by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA; ACDA 1975-1992). If a recipient was exporting arms in the year of the influence attempt, it was considered that indigenous arms production capabilities were present. There were 60 cases where such production was present and 93 where it was absent, with 38 missing cases.

Three variables focus on the interaction between recipient and supplier. The supp.arms variable is a percentage from 0 to 100, measuring the amount of arms a recipient received from the supplier as a ratio of total arms received. Brzoska and Ohlson (1987) and the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (1991) present this data in 5-year blocks, for example, U.S. arms exports to Israel from 1971 to 1975 were 96%. Any influence attempt to Israel in that time period was coded 96%. Recipients obtained from almost 0% to 100% of their arms from the United States, with 35 missing cases.

The trade variable measures whether or not the recipient trades with the supplier. Two groups were identified with United Nations data (UN; UN Various years): Recipients listed by the UN had significant trade with the United States and were coded as possessing trade relations, whereas countries that were not on the list had no or little trade with the United States and were coded as possessing no such relations. There were 115 cases where the influence attempt was made in a larger trade relationship, and 72 cases where it was not, with 4 missing cases. The precedent variable is categorical, measuring the outcome of the last attempt made on that recipient (Sislin 1993). Three possibilities were coded: the past attempt failed in 67 cases, succeeded in 61 cases, or there was no past attempt in 63 cases.

There were two variables on supplier characteristics. The cohesion variable, in percentage form, measures the unity of the supplier toward an attempt as the degree of agreement between the president and Congress—two important and visible actors in the arms sales process. The measurement assumes that the more members of the House and Senate who belong to the president's party as identified by *Congressional Quarterly* (1991), the more cohesion there is likely to be. Cohesion is thus the percentage of House members and Senate members of the president's party divided by two and ranging from 35% under Truman to 68% under Johnson. The p.style variable measures the impact of the president's style on the outcome (Barber 1992). It is argued that active-positive presidents (Truman, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, and Bush) are most likely to obtain successful outcomes. Ninety-two influence attempts were made under active-positive presidents, and 99 cases under all other types of presidents.

The final two variables focus on systemic characteristics. The hegemony variable measures whether the United States was in a period of hegemonic decline or not. The United States became a hegemon after World War II and declined sometime in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A break-point of 1967 results in 80 predecline attempts and 111 decline attempts. The cooperation variable measures the degree of conflict and cooperation between the superpowers and is presented in two parts (Goldstein and Freeman 1990). Cooperation.1 is COPDAB data of the monthly average level of cooperation and conflict between the two countries, aggregated into an annual average for the years from 1950 to 1978, with 58 missing cases. Cooperation.2 measures superpower conflict and cooperation from 1979 to 1989, with annual estimates from the WEIS data set, with 143 missing cases.

## ANALYSIS

Descriptive analysis of the data set yields two important findings. First, arms are employed as a potential instrument of influence many times. Across most geographic regions of the world, 191 cases were found, with an emphasis on the Third World. Second, less than half of all attempts succeeded. Of the 191 cases, only 80 or 42% of the attempts were coded as successful. In this statement lies the clearest explanation of why arms transfer scholars find arms influence attempts sometimes succeed and sometimes fail—it depends on which cases are examined. To explain when arms influence attempts succeed, all attempts must be considered.

Initially, multivariate logit was employed to test the outcome against all independent variables in a single model. Because the cooperation variable consists of two measures, which do not overlap, both cannot be tested in the same model. The multivariate test with the cooperation.1 variable failed to yield any variables significant at the .05 level. The test with the cooperation.2 variable had so many missing cases that no observations could be tested.[15] To solve this predicament, each variable was tested separately against the outcome (see Table 1).

Nine different variables were statistically significant. These nine were then tested together, resulting in four statistically significant variables: sanction, policy, supp.arms, and hegemony. I then added one variable at a time to this preliminary model from the list of those variables that were statistically significant in the bivariate tests. The result of this process was that only the regime variable was statistically significant, although the coefficient is negative. I then added the regime variable to the model and proceeded to add one variable at a time to this model from the list of variables that were not significant in the bivariate tests. (In case that was the result of some confounding variable no longer under consideration.) No variable, previously insignificant in the bivariate tests, became significant. The result of this winnowing process is a model consisting of five robust variables (see Table 2).

The next step is to determine the relative importance of each of these five variables to the outcome of an influence attempt. Using the results from Table 2, the logit equation of the determinants of success can be expressed as

$$\text{the probability of successful outcome} = -3.91 + 2.34(\text{sanction}) + 1.27(\text{policy}) - 1.52(\text{regime}) + 0.03(\text{supp.arms}) + 2.1(\text{hegemony}).$$

15. If a case had missing data for any of the potential determinants, it was thrown out of the analysis. The number of cases actually tested are listed in Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE 1
Results of Bivariate Logit Analysis on Each Independent Variable

| *Variable* | *Coefficient* | t | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanction type | 2.27 | 6.47** | 191 |
| Deterrence | 0.12 | 0.35 | 191 |
| Policy type | 1.99 | 5.53** | 191 |
| Regime type | –2.17 | –4.65** | 191 |
| Conflict | 0.30 | 0.83 | 176 |
| Security | –0.01 | –1.12 | 133 |
| Civil strife | –1.74 | –3.08** | 176 |
| Resource | 0.00 | 2.71** | 148 |
| Indigenous arms production | –0.60 | –1.77 | 153 |
| Supplier arms | 0.02 | 4.77** | 156 |
| Trade | 0.70 | 2.24* | 187 |
| Precedent | 0.83 | 4.27** | 191 |
| Supplier cohesion | –0.01 | –0.69 | 191 |
| Presidential style | –0.31 | –1.04 | 191 |
| Hegemony | 1.12 | 3.66** | 191 |
| Cooperation.1 | –0.00 | –0.37 | 133 |
| Cooperation.2 | –0.01 | –0.33 | 48 |

* Significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level.

By inputting the actual numbers that the independent variables may take, the probability estimate from the logit analysis can be calculated, and this estimate can be transformed into the probability of success.

For example, the worst case for the United States is when the sanction is negative, the policy issue is domestic, the regime type is military, the United States sells no arms to the supplier and the United States is in a period of decline. Under these conditions, the probability of a successful influence attempt occurring in such a situation is 0.4%. At the opposite extreme, where the sanction is positive, the policy issue focuses on changing foreign policy, the regime type is civilian, the United States is the sole supplier to the recipient, and the United States is the clear hegemon. The probability that an arms influence attempt will succeed is 99%.

An important finding in this analysis is that the probability of success given a single independent variable is quite low. As noted above, in the worst case, the probability of success is less than 1%. Changing only one variable at a time results in at best an increase in probability to about 8%. This finding supports the argument that we need to look at several explanatory forces acting in unison. This also implies that not every force must be aligned with the supplier to result in successful influence attempts.

TABLE 2
The Determinants of Successful Arms Influence Attempts

| *Variable* | *Coefficient* | t |
|---|---|---|
| Sanction type | 2.34 | 4.01** |
| Policy type | 1.27 | 2.46* |
| Regime type | –1.52 | –2.36* |
| Supplier arms | 0.03 | 3.68** |
| Hegemony | 2.10 | 3.71** |
| Constant | –3.91 | –5.00** |

$\chi^2 = 97.93$**
$N = 156$
* Significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level.

One way to examine many probabilities at once is to graph the specified conditions of the variables against the probability of success. Figure 1 is such a graph.

The vertical y-axis is the probability of successful influence attempt outcomes, from 0 to 1 (or 0% to 100%). The baseline horizontal x-axis is the percentage of arms the recipient receives from the supplier (supp.arms), measured from 0% to 100%. The first line, supplier arms, then is the variable with which the other four may be related. To plot this line, all the other independent variables were held constant. As the figure shows, under these conditions, when the United States sells no arms to a country it has only about a 2% chance of successfully influencing it. As the United States sells more and more arms to the recipient, its likelihood of success rises to approximately 29%.

The remainder of the independent variables are plotted against this line. For example, the next variable plotted is sanction. This variable is set to positive, while the policy, regime, and hegemony variables remain constant. When the sanction was positive, the United States sold no arms, the policy focus was domestic, the regime civilian, and hegemony in decline; the United States had a 17% probability of success. As the United States sold more and more arms to a recipient, that probability rose to 81%. Note that, as predicted, when the regime variable is military, the probability of success is reduced; hence this line is plotted below the supplier arms line. No matter how much arms the United States sells, the probability of successful outcomes is always lower when the regime type is military than if it were civilian. The final line is a best model line when sanction is positive, policy issue is foreign, regime is civilian, and hegemonic power exists. The United States is very likely to succeed in such cases, regardless of how much arms it sells.




**Figure 1: The Probability of Successful Arms Influence Attempts**

## CONCLUSION

Over the 1950-1992 period, the United States frequently attempted to influence other countries by manipulating its arms exports. The United States has tried to restore constitutional democracies in South America, end hostilities in the Middle East, obtain military bases throughout the world, and foster human rights all via the judicious application of its arms transfer policies. These efforts succeeded slightly less than half of the time.

Five variables appear to affect the outcome of an influence attempt. Positive sanctions were found to increase the probability of success, although the fact that "carrots" are more effective must be weighed against the negative consequences of arms sales, such as increased propensity for conflict. Attempts to change the recipient's foreign policy were also more likely to succeed, suggesting that no matter how noble American efforts are, getting a recipient government to be more democratic or advance human rights is very difficult. Contrary to the hypothesis, civilian regimes proved more susceptible to influence attempts, reinforcing the conclusion that it is difficult to make military governments more democratic because both the policy type (domestic) and the regime type (military) hinder such efforts. As the recipient obtained more American arms, it became more vulnerable to United States influence attempts, reinforcing the supplier's use of positive sanctions, which may foster dependence. Finally, American successes seemed related to American power, as influence attempts succeeded more often prior to the period of hegemonic decline.

Among the apparently nonrelevant variables, two points can be raised. Many of the variables that the United States can control, such as the supplier characteristics, did not appear salient to the outcome of the influence attempt. Moreover, in at least two cases, conventional wisdom is challenged: This analysis failed to support the notion that nations in conflict are more susceptible to influence attempts or that indigenous arms production reduced vulnerability.

Finally, the question of when influence attempts succeed raises the more difficult question of why. Although we can now describe a variety of arms influence attempts and can predict outcomes based on the nature of the five variables suggested above, it is still not entirely resolved why arms influence attempts succeed or fail. The nature of the attempt and some international and domestic forces directly affect the recipient's calculus and the attempt's outcome. Moreover, only those international contextual factors that seem easy to fit into the decision calculus seem relevant: Hegemony and the amount of supplier arms always operate in the same way and apparently are easier to interpret in terms of their impact on costs, benefits, and probabilities. Other international factors, such as trade or precedent, presumably are not considered by recipients who are unsure how these factors operate on their calculus. Domestic factors may be important in conjunction with international factors (e.g., defense allocation interacts with dependence on the supplier's arms), suggesting the possibility of indirect effects between the type of attempt, and international and domestic factors. Together these findings suggest the start of a model based on expected utility and decision making, which explains the determinants of successful influence.

The United States continues to use arms influence attempts. President Clinton in early 1993, for example, suspended U.S. military assistance to Guatemala to attempt to bring about greater governmental stability (*New York Times*, May 28, 1993). Since then, suspensions have been applied against Burma and Zaire. That these efforts have not succeeded to date is less surprising and mysterious given this article's findings.

# APPENDIX
## American Arms-Influence Attempts, 1950-1992, by Year and Recipient

| *Number* | *Year* | *Recipient* | *Description* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1950 | Iran | Aid suspension to redirect Shah's government. |
| 2 | 1951 | Saudi Arabia | Arms in exchange for access to military base. |
| 3 | 1952 | Brazil | Military aid in exchange for raw materials. |
| 4 | 1952 | Chile | Military aid in exchange for raw materials. |
| 5 | 1952 | Cuba | Military aid in exchange for raw materials. |
| 6 | 1952 | Ecuador | Military aid in exchange for raw materials. |
| 7 | 1952 | Iran | Aid suspension to force compliance with treaty. |
| 8 | 1952 | Ireland | Aid suspension to force compliance with treaty. |
| 9 | 1952 | Peru | Military aid in exchange for raw materials. |
| 10 | 1953 | Ethiopia | Arms in exchange for access to military base. |
| 11 | 1954 | France | Aid reduced to force ratification of EDC treaty. |
| 12 | 1954 | Guatemala | Arms suspension to weaken pro-Communist government. |
| 13 | 1954 | Italy | Aid reduced to force ratification of EDC treaty. |
| 14 | 1954 | Pakistan | Arms in exchange for alliance agreement. |
| 15 | 1956 | Israel | Arms suspension to limit hostilities toward Egypt. |
| 16 | 1956 | Yugoslavia | Aid suspension to prevent closer Soviet ties. |
| 17 | 1957 | Brazil | Military aid in exchange for military base. |
| 18 | 1957 | Saudi Arabia | Increased aid for continued access to facilities. |
| 19 | 1957 | Yugoslavia | Military aid to facilitate independence from USSR. |
| 20 | 1958 | Cuba | Arms embargo to bring an end to civil war. |
| 21 | 1958 | Dominican Republic | Partial suspension to protest repression. |
| 22 | 1958 | Iraq | Aid suspension to punish government after coup. |
| 23 | 1960 | Dominican Republic | Aid suspension to force government reform. |
| 24 | 1960 | Ethiopia | Arms in exchange for access to military base. |
| 25 | 1960 | Laos | Aid suspension to weaken Communist elements. |
| 26 | 1962 | India | Aid to resolve Kashmir issue. |
| 27 | 1962 | Iran | Partial aid suspension to redirect economic growth. |
| 28 | 1962 | Peru | Aid suspension to encourage democratic elections. |
| 29 | 1963 | Dominican Republic | Aid suspension to encourage democratic elections. |
| 30 | 1963 | Honduras | Aid suspension to encourage democratic elections. |
| 31 | 1963 | Indonesia | Aid suspension to reduce conflict with Malaysia. |
| 32 | 1963 | South Africa | Arms embargo to end apartheid. |
| 33 | 1963 | South Vietnam | Aid suspension to reduce government repression. |
| 34 | 1963 | Spain | Aid increase for continued access to military bases. |
| 35 | 1964 | France | Aid suspension to protest trade with Cuba. |
| 36 | 1964 | Iran | Aid increase for Status of Forces Agreement. |
| 37 | 1964 | Morocco | Aid suspension to protest trade with Cuba. |
| 38 | 1964 | South Korea | Aid for support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. |
| 39 | 1964 | Spain | Aid suspension to protest trade with Cuba. |

## APPENDIX continued

| *Number* | *Year* | *Recipient* | *Description* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | 1964 | Turkey | Threatened suspension if Cyprus attacked. |
| 41 | 1964 | United Kingdom | Aid suspension to protest trade with Cuba. |
| 42 | 1965 | India | Aid suspension to end Indo-Pakistani War. |
| 43 | 1965 | Pakistan | Aid suspension to end Indo-Pakistani War. |
| 44 | 1965 | Peru | Aid denied to facilitate economic development. |
| 45 | 1966 | Greece | Threatened suspension if Cuban trade continued. |
| 46 | 1966 | Iran | Arms sale to prevent Soviet in-roads. |
| 47 | 1966 | Jordan | Arms sale to prevent Soviet in-roads. |
| 48 | 1967 | Greece | Aid suspension to restore democracy. |
| 49 | 1967 | India | Denial of future aid to reduce arms race. |
| 50 | 1967 | Iraq | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 51 | 1967 | Israel | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 52 | 1967 | Jordan | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 53 | 1967 | Lebanon | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 54 | 1967 | Libya | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 55 | 1967 | Morocco | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 56 | 1967 | Nigeria | Aid suspension to end civil war. |
| 57 | 1967 | Pakistan | Denial of future aid to reduce arms race. |
| 58 | 1967 | Saudi Arabia | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 59 | 1967 | Sudan | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 60 | 1967 | Syria | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 61 | 1967 | Tunisia | Aid suspension to end Arab-Israeli war. |
| 62 | 1968 | Brazil | Reduce aid to reduce government militarism. |
| 63 | 1968 | Ecuador | Aid suspension over seizure of U.S. fishing vessels. |
| 64 | 1968 | Jordan | Arms sale to prevent Soviet in-roads. |
| 65 | 1968 | Panama | Aid suspension to protest coup. |
| 66 | 1968 | South Korea | Aid package to pacify South Korean frustration. |
| 67 | 1969 | El Salvador | Aid suspension to end Soccer war. |
| 68 | 1969 | Honduras | Aid suspension to end Soccer war. |
| 69 | 1969 | Peru | Aid suspension over seizure of U.S. fishing vessels. |
| 70 | 1969 | Spain | Aid increase for continued access to military bases. |
| 71 | 1970 | Greece | End of embargo to improve cooperation. |
| 72 | 1970 | Israel | Delay of aid decision to induce diplomatic moderation. |
| 73 | 1970 | Israel | Promise of future aid if cease-fire plan is accepted. |
| 74 | 1970 | Israel | Promise of arms to prevent Soviet in-roads in Jordan. |
| 75 | 1970 | Israel | Military credit offer to return Jarring talks. |
| 76 | 1970 | Spain | Aid increase for continued access to military bases. |
| 77 | 1971 | Ecuador | Aid suspension over seizure of U.S. fishing vessels. |
| 78 | 1971 | India | Aid suspension to end Indo-Pakistani war. |
| 79 | 1971 | Israel | Arms sales for agreement to hold proximity talks. |
| 80 | 1971 | Pakistan | Aid embargo to end civil war. |
| 81 | 1973 | Israel | Delay of arms to force cease-fire acceptance. |
| 82 | 1973 | Israel | Promise of future arms for cease-fire acceptance. |
| 83 | 1973 | Libya | Blocked arms sales over support for terrorism. |

## APPENDIX continued

| Number | Year | Recipient | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 84 | 1973 | South Korea | Decreased military aid to improve human rights. |
| 85 | 1974 | Chile | Prohibited aid to improve human rights. |
| 86 | 1974 | Greece | Threatened aid suspension if war with Turkey. |
| 87 | 1974 | Israel | Promised increased aid for participation in Sinai I. |
| 88 | 1974 | Israel | Forgave military debt for Golan disengagement. |
| 89 | 1974 | Turkey | Threatened aid suspension if war with Greece. |
| 90 | 1975 | Angola | Prohibited aid over fighting in Angola. |
| 91 | 1975 | Belgium | Incentives to buy U.S. fighter planes. |
| 92 | 1975 | Denmark | Incentives to buy U.S. fighter planes. |
| 93 | 1975 | Ethiopia | Increased aid to maintain base access. |
| 94 | 1975 | Israel | Delay of arms to force Sinai II agreement. |
| 95 | 1975 | Israel | Promise of arms to force Sinai II. |
| 96 | 1975 | Netherlands | Incentives to buy U.S. fighter planes. |
| 97 | 1975 | Norway | Incentives to buy U.S. fighter planes. |
| 98 | 1975 | Peru | Restricted aid to prevent arms race with Chile. |
| 99 | 1975 | South Korea | Threatened aid suspension over nuclear proliferation. |
| 100 | 1975 | Turkey | Arms embargo to end Cyprus crisis. |
| 101 | 1975 | Turkey | Aid offer to open American military bases. |
| 102 | 1976 | Chile | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 103 | 1976 | Ethiopia | Arms denied to limit military aggression. |
| 104 | 1976 | Pakistan | Aid promised to forgo nuclear reactor purchase. |
| 105 | 1976 | Spain | Aid increase for continued access to military bases. |
| 106 | 1976 | Uruguay | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 107 | 1977 | Argentina | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 108 | 1977 | Brazil | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 109 | 1977 | El Salvador | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 110 | 1977 | Ethiopia | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 111 | 1977 | Greece | Aid for military base access. |
| 112 | 1977 | Guatemala | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 113 | 1977 | Iran | Aid reduction to improve human rights. |
| 114 | 1977 | Israel | Blocked sale to prevent arms race in South America. |
| 115 | 1977 | Nicaragua | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 116 | 1977 | Pakistan | Threatened aid suspension over nuclear proliferation. |
| 117 | 1977 | Paraguay | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 118 | 1977 | Philippines | Aid reduction to improve human rights. |
| 119 | 1977 | Somalia | Arms denied until troops left the Ogaden. |
| 120 | 1977 | South Africa | Strengthened arms embargo. |
| 121 | 1977 | Uruguay | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 122 | 1978 | Argentina | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 123 | 1978 | Egypt | Aircraft sale to facilitate peace negotiations. |
| 124 | 1978 | Ethiopia | Blocked aid to diminish military capability. |
| 125 | 1978 | Guatemala | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 126 | 1978 | Israel | Aircraft sale to facilitate peace negotiations. |
| 127 | 1978 | Israel | Promised increased aid to facilitate Saudi sale. |

**APPENDIX continued**

| *Number* | *Year* | *Recipient* | *Description* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 128 | 1978 | Israel | Threatened aid suspension over arms left in Lebanon. |
| 129 | 1978 | Libya | Refusal to sell equipment over terrorist support. |
| 130 | 1978 | Nicaragua | Aid reduction to improve human rights. |
| 131 | 1978 | Pakistan | Aid offer to slow nuclear program. |
| 132 | 1978 | Philippines | Froze aid to improve human rights. |
| 133 | 1978 | Somalia | Promised aid if troops left the Ogaden. |
| 134 | 1979 | Bolivia | Military credit suspension to foster democracy. |
| 135 | 1979 | Nicaragua | Future aid suspension over political instability. |
| 136 | 1979 | Pakistan | Aid suspension to slow nuclear program. |
| 137 | 1979 | Pakistan | Aircraft offer to slow nuclear program. |
| 138 | 1979 | Philippines | Promised increased aid to continued access to bases. |
| 139 | 1979 | Portugal | Aid for base. |
| 140 | 1979 | Turkey | Promised increased aid for over-flight rights. |
| 141 | 1979 | Zaire | Aid reduction to improve human rights. |
| 142 | 1980 | Bolivia | Aid suspension to foster democracy. |
| 143 | 1980 | El Salvador | Aid suspension to protest nun murders. |
| 144 | 1980 | Guatemala | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 145 | 1980 | Kenya | Aid for base. |
| 146 | 1980 | Morocco | Promised to release aid if peace negotiations started. |
| 147 | 1980 | Oman | Aid for base. |
| 148 | 1980 | Somalia | Aid for base. |
| 149 | 1981 | Israel | Promised aid to prevent opposition to Saudi sale. |
| 150 | 1981 | Israel | Partial suspension to punish Iraqi raid. |
| 151 | 1981 | Israel | Expanded suspension after raids on PLO in Lebanon. |
| 152 | 1981 | Israel | Suspended agreement over Golan Heights annexation. |
| 153 | 1981 | Libya | Exports control to limit military capability. |
| 154 | 1981 | Pakistan | Increased aid to slow nuclear program. |
| 155 | 1982 | Argentina | Arms embargo to end Falklands war. |
| 156 | 1982 | Israel | Partial suspension after invasion of Lebanon. |
| 157 | 1982 | Morocco | Increased aid for facilities. |
| 158 | 1983 | Guatemala | Aid resumption for improved human rights. |
| 159 | 1983 | Guatemala | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 160 | 1983 | Israel | Embargo lifted for troop withdrawal from Lebanon. |
| 161 | 1983 | Philippines | Promise of aid for continued access to bases. |
| 162 | 1984 | Philippines | Decreased aid to curb government abuses. |
| 163 | 1985 | Guatemala | Promise of military credit to end military rule. |
| 164 | 1985 | Iran | Arms for assistance in hostage release. |
| 165 | 1985 | Philippines | Decreased aid to curb government abuses. |
| 166 | 1986 | Philippines | Promise of increased aid if elections are fair. |
| 167 | 1986 | Philippines | Threat of suspension if violence after elections. |
| 168 | 1987 | Haiti | Aid suspension to foster democracy. |
| 169 | 1987 | Israel | Concessions to cancel fighter program. |
| 170 | 1987 | Panama | Aid suspension after anti-U.S. demonstrations. |
| 171 | 1987 | Panama | Denied future aid to foster democracy. |

## APPENDIX continued

| *Number* | *Year* | *Recipient* | *Description* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 172 | 1987 | Saudi Arabia | Delay of plane sale to improve cooperation with United States. |
| 173 | 1988 | Burma | Aid suspension over demonstrations and violence. |
| 174 | 1988 | Burma | Aid suspension after coup. |
| 175 | 1988 | Somalia | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 176 | 1988 | Sudan | Froze aid to force debt payment. |
| 177 | 1989 | Bolivia | Aid to fight narcotics. |
| 178 | 1989 | China | Aid suspension to foster democracy. |
| 179 | 1989 | Colombia | Aid to fight narcotics. |
| 180 | 1989 | Peru | Aid to fight narcotics. |
| 181 | 1989 | Somalia | Aid suspension after riots and executions. |
| 182 | 1990 | El Salvador | Aid reduction to force negotiations with Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). |
| 183 | 1990 | Guatemala | Threatened suspension to protest murder of American. |
| 184 | 1990 | Guatemala | Aid suspension to protest human rights abuse. |
| 185 | 1990 | Kenya | Delayed aid to improve human rights. |
| 186 | 1990 | Pakistan | Aid suspension to slow nuclear program. |
| 187 | 1990 | Zaire | Aid suspension to improve human rights. |
| 188 | 1991 | Jordan | Aid suspension to punish pro-Iraqi stance. |
| 189 | 1991 | Philippines | Aid for continued access to bases. |
| 190 | 1991 | United Arab Emirates | Aid to foster cooperation. |
| 191 | 1992 | Peru | Aid suspension to foster democracy. |

SOURCE: Sislin (1993).

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