

Sanctions & the Search for Security:

Challenges to UN Action

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Sanctions and Regional Security: The Crisis in West Africa

The United Nations (UN) has made an enormous commitment to resolving armed conflict in Sierra Leone and, increasingly, in the entire West African region. As in Angola, a mission that experienced initial setbacks gradually began to show positive results. A combination of factors—battlefield reverses for the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the introduction of a large UN peacekeeping force and British troops, and the strengthening of UN sanctions—shifted the political balance in favor of the government and created conditions for a successful cease-fire. Although enormous security problems remain in Sierra Leone and armed conflict continues in neighboring Liberia and Guinea, the overall political situation has improved considerably, thanks in large part to the role of the United Nations.

The United Nations immersed itself deeply in the tortured affairs of Sierra Leone. The Security Council deployed the largest United Nations peacekeeping force in the world, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), with an authorized strength of more than 17,000 troops. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration commission succeeded in demobilizing more than 46,000 combatants.¹ UN humanitarian agencies mounted major relief and refugee support operations in the region. A special criminal court was authorized to try RUF leaders for crimes against humanity. The Security Council imposed targeted sanctions on both the RUF and the Liberian government of Charles Taylor. Numerous UN envoys and assessment missions crisscrossed the region, monitoring humanitarian and security conditions; brokering cease-fires; and attempting to implement peace agreements, including a major disarmament, demobilization, and resettlement effort.

The goal of these efforts has been to end the armed conflict in Sierra Leone and bring about a settlement between the RUF and the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah within the general framework of the 1999 Lomé peace agreement. The RUF previously violated


the cease-fire and demobilization aspects of the agreement and in May 2000 even captured and killed UN peacekeepers. A May 2001 UN inter-agency mission to West Africa questioned whether the political aspects of the agreement, such as power sharing and the transformation of the RUF into a political party, could be reconciled with the fact that many RUF leaders were suspected of committing gross violations of human rights.² The International Crisis Group (ICG) termed the Lomé accord “utterly misguided” and described it as “a vain exercise motivated largely by political expediency . . . to elevate those responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians into statesmen.”³ With the recent changes in political and military conditions, however, the prospects for a more peaceful transition have improved.

As the UN has become steadily more involved, the crisis has spread and become increasingly regional. Within Sierra Leone itself, armed conflict has ebbed, following a November 2000 cease-fire (reaffirmed in May 2001), but fighting has spread to Guinea and Liberia. The two countries have mounted armed attacks and supported internal rebellions against the other. In the summer and fall of 2000, RUF and Liberian forces began crossing into Guinea’s southeastern diamond region, and Guinean troops attacked RUF and Liberian army-controlled areas. Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, a rebel group supported by Guinea, has engaged in armed skirmishes with Liberian government troops, bringing the fighting close to Monrovia in early 2002.

The crisis has threatened to spread its destabilizing influences even farther afield, to Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and the Casamance region of Senegal.⁴ The UN interagency mission to West Africa spoke of a possible “domino effect” that could engulf the entire region.⁵ The ICG placed the crisis in Sierra Leone “at the heart of a series of conflicts that risk forming an arc of violence from southern Senegal to the Ivory Coast.”⁶ The conflict has developed into “a human tragedy of massive proportions that is rapidly becoming a security nightmare for all of West Africa.”⁷

The Role of Sanctions

Security Council sanctions have been a central part of the UN response to the crisis in West Africa. Sanctions have steadily become more sophisticated and far-reaching as the crisis has deepened. Sanctions



SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA, Security Council Resolutions

Resolution Number	Action
SIERRA LEONE 1132	8 October 1997 Imposed an oil embargo and an arms embargo Imposed travel sanctions on members of the AFRC junta and their families Conditioned the lifting of sanctions on the junta relinquishing power Created the sanctions committee
1156	16 March 1998 Lifted the oil embargo
1171	6 June 1998 Confirmed the removal of sanctions on the government Reimposed the arms embargo and travel ban on the RUF and members of the former military junta
1306	5 July 2000 Imposed an embargo on all diamond exports not under the control of the government Established the panel of experts
LIBERIA 788	19 November 1992 Imposed a limited arms embargo (exempted ECOMOG forces)
985	13 April 1995 Created the sanctions committee
1343	7 March 2001 Demanded cessation of support for the RUF in Sierra Leone Reimposed the arms embargo, imposed assets freeze, travel ban, and diamond embargo after a two-month grace period

were first imposed against Sierra Leone in response to the May 1997 overthrow of the Kabbah government by disgruntled members of the armed forces, with subsequent backing from the RUF. In October 1997, responding to a request from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Council approved Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1132, imposing an arms embargo, an oil embargo, and a travel ban on members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military junta and their families. ECOWAS had imposed general trade sanctions, but the Security Council opted for more targeted and selective measures to avoid exacerbating an already severe humanitarian emergency. In March 1998, following the ouster of the military junta by ECOWAS forces, the Council adopted SCR 1156, lifting the oil embargo on the government. In June 1998, the Council approved SCR 1171, confirming the lifting of sanctions on the restored Kabbah government but reimposing the arms embargo and travel ban on the RUF and former members of the military junta. The decision to reimpose sanctions came in response to the continuing armed rebellion by the RUF and its allies. For a list of Security Council sanctions on Sierra Leone and Liberia, see the box on page 80.

In July 2000, following further armed attacks by the RUF and the capture of UN peacekeepers, the Council significantly increased the pressure on the rebels. Recognizing "the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fueling the conflict in Sierra Leone," the Council adopted SCR 1306, imposing an embargo on all diamonds originating in Sierra Leone.⁸ The diamond embargo was to apply to all diamond exports from Sierra Leone until the government in Freetown created a certification system that would exclude diamonds originating from RUF-controlled areas.

As part of SCR 1306, the Council created a panel of experts to report on possible violations of the sanctions. The panel was also asked to examine the links between the diamond trade and arms trafficking and to assess the adequacy of air traffic control in the region. The panel report, issued in December 2000, confirmed that "diamonds have become an important resource for Sierra Leone's RUF in sustaining and advancing its military ambitions."⁹ It also found "widespread breaking of the UN Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds."¹⁰ The panel report issued a number of policy recommendations for plugging the leaks in the sanctions regime and improving overall compliance. Its most important recommendation was the imposition of sanctions on Liberia.

Pressuring Liberia

The RUF and the government of Charles Taylor in Liberia are closely linked. The RUF was essentially created by Taylor. It received indispensable support from Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and after 1997, following Taylor's election as president, from the government of Liberia. Taylor encouraged and supported RUF incursions into Sierra Leone, helping the rebel group establish a strong foothold in the alluvial diamond fields of the eastern Mano River region, which is shared by the two countries. RUF forces have since dominated the diamond fields, largely on behalf of Taylor. As a result, Liberia, a country with little previous diamond production, became a major diamond exporter. A very high portion of these diamonds originated in RUF regions of Sierra Leone, but some reportedly also came from territory in Angola controlled by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.¹¹

Liberia's efforts to exploit diamond production have been at the heart of the conflict in Sierra Leone. As a report by Partnership Africa Canada concluded:

There is little doubt that Liberia has become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to smuggling and theft throughout Africa and considerably further afield. In return for weapons, it has provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the same for other diamond producing countries, fueling war and providing a safe haven for organized crime.¹²

The Sierra Leone expert panel "found unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training, weapons and related matériel, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks, and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation."¹³ The panel also found that "the bulk of RUF diamonds leave Sierra Leone through Liberia" and that this illicit trade "could not be conducted without the permission and the involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest level."¹⁴ The panel concluded that "Charles Taylor is actively involved in fueling the violence in Sierra Leone."¹⁵

UN sanctions were first imposed on Liberia in 1992. In November of that year, the Security Council adopted SCR 788, which established an arms embargo. The Council acted in response to a request for UN sanctions from ECOWAS, which had intervened militarily in the Liberian war in an attempt to prevent Charles Taylor and the NPFL

from taking power. The arms embargo was not enforced, however (more than two years elapsed before the Council even created a sanctions committee), and it played no role in limiting the NPFL insurgency. The arms embargo was kept in place after Taylor was elected president in 1997.

In March 2001, as evidence of Taylor's support for the RUF mounted, the Council approved new sanctions against Liberia. SCR 1343 reauthorized the arms embargo, imposed a travel ban on senior members of the government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses, and mandated that Liberia freeze the financial assets of the RUF. The resolution also placed an embargo on all diamond exports from Liberia. At the request of ECOWAS, implementation of the sanctions was delayed two months to give Liberia a chance to comply with UN demands. The Council judged the initial response from Monrovia to be inadequate and proceeded to enact the sanctions in May 2001. The implementing resolution called for the creation of a panel of experts to report on sanctions violations and recommend steps for enhancing compliance.

SCR 1343 represented the first time the Security Council imposed sanctions against one country because of its refusal to comply with sanctions against another country. The sanctions against Liberia were intended to strike at the source of the RUF rebellion. They were also a form of secondary pressure designed to persuade Liberia to cut off its support for the RUF.

The Sierra Leone panel of experts urged consideration of additional secondary measures. It suggested the extension of diamond sanctions to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, if these countries did not adopt a diamond certification system similar to that in Sierra Leone.¹⁶ The panel also urged that restrictions on arms exports be placed on specific producer countries found to be violating the embargo on Sierra Leone.¹⁷ It is unlikely that the Council will adopt these additional measures to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the decision to impose secondary measures against Liberia was a significant development, one that may lead to similar developments in other cases.

Monrovia Replies

Liberia responded to the threat of sanctions with a series of gestures designed to demonstrate a willingness to comply with UN demands. In January 2001, the government announced that it was no longer support-

ing the RUF militarily or financially, that all persons associated with the RUF had been ordered to leave Liberia, that RUF financial assets in Liberian banks were frozen, that diamond imports from Sierra Leone were banned, and that Liberia's own diamond exports were being suspended for 120 days, pending the creation of an internationally acceptable certification system for Liberia. These announced concessions appeared to indicate that sanctions were having an immediate and powerful effect. A delegation from ECOWAS that visited Liberia in April 2001 reported that the government of Liberia "seemed serious in meeting the demands of the Security Council."¹⁸ The ECOWAS mission found Liberia's announced plans to control diamonds "commendable."¹⁹

The ECOWAS delegation also found grounds for skepticism, however. It reported that known RUF leaders, including Sam Bockarie, were seen openly in the streets of Monrovia. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also seemed unconvinced. In his April 2001 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted Liberia's announcements but observed that the UN "does not have the capacity to provide independent confirmation of the claims by the Government of Liberia."²⁰ Members of the Security Council in New York were clearly skeptical about Liberia's actions. ECOWAS had recommended an observation mission to determine if Taylor's announcements were genuine, but members of the Security Council demurred. The Council refused to consider any further delay and duly enacted the sanctions in May 2001 at the conclusion of the previously agreed sixty-day waiting period.

Liberia's initial response to the threat of Security Council action appeared to indicate a real concern about the potential impact of sanctions. As West African officials told the UN interagency mission, "The threat of such sanctions might be more effective than their actual imposition."²¹ The very fact that the gestures were made was a sign of sanctions impact. The threat of sanctions altered the Monrovia government's policy calculations. Before the adoption of SCR 1343, Liberia had little regard for the importuning of the Security Council and certainly had no reason to fear the mostly forgotten and ignored arms embargo, originally established in 1992. Once the Security Council became serious about imposing more effective sanctions, however, the Taylor regime began to take notice and mounted a diplomatic effort to give the appearance of cooperation.

This pattern of initial response to the threat of sanctions was also evident in the case of Sierra Leone. When ECOWAS and UN sanctions were imposed against the military junta in Freetown in 1997, coup lead-

ers agreed to enter into negotiations. Just fifteen days after the Security Council adopted SCR 1132 in October 1997, the junta signed an agreement in Conakry pledging to restore the elected government of Sierra Leone within six months. It took military action from ECOWAS, however, to enforce this pledge. As noted in Chapter 1, a similar pattern of targeted regimes responding to the threat or initial imposition of sanctions occurred in several other cases, including Somalia, Libya, Haiti, and Afghanistan. This general pattern of an initial response to sanctions is noteworthy.

Social Impacts

Humanitarian conditions in Sierra Leone, already among the worst in the world, have continued to deteriorate in recent years, according to the reports of the Secretary-General.²² Sierra Leone and Liberia rank near the bottom of the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index. The wars and political turmoil of the past decade have pushed people in the two countries ever deeper into poverty and misery. Estimates of the number of people killed over the past decade in Sierra Leone range from 43,000 to 75,000.²³ In Liberia, the eight-year war resulted in an estimated 200,000 deaths before finally coming to an end in 1997.²⁴ Only 37 percent of adult Liberians are considered literate, and 80 percent of the population lives in poverty, on less than U.S.\$1 a day.²⁵ Sierra Leone has experienced one of the worst refugee crises in the world. Some 2 million people, almost half the country's population, have been forced to flee their homes.²⁶ In 2001, Guinea was hosting 300,000 refugees from Sierra Leone and 120,000 from Liberia.²⁷ The huge numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in the region have created acute problems of overcrowding in UN camps and transit centers.

The horrendous social conditions within Sierra Leone and Liberia have resulted not from sanctions but from war, impoverishment, and corruption. The ECOWAS trade sanctions in 1997 hindered food shipments and relief efforts in Sierra Leone, according to a 1998 assessment by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,²⁸ but these effects were relatively short-lived. UN sanctions, in contrast, were intentionally designed to avoid adverse consequences for the general population. The embargoes on weapons imports and the travel bans on designated RUF and Liberian government leaders were selective measures that avoided broader social impacts.

There is no evidence of social impacts from the embargo on diamond exports. The UN's October 2001 assessment of humanitarian consequences in Liberia made no mention of the diamond sanctions. In Sierra Leone, the workers who dig and pan through the mud of the alluvial diamond fields have continued to mine precious stones. By 2000, the Sierra Leone government and UNAMSIL were in control of most of the mining areas. Diamond traders were able to maintain their operations, provided they obtained government-approved certificates of origin. In Liberia, the diamond sanctions could affect the intermediaries who illegally bring diamonds from Sierra Leone to market, but denying enrichment opportunities for these smugglers and the political leaders who support them is precisely the point of the sanctions.

The social impact of possible future sanctions on the Liberian timber industry could be severe. According to the October 2001 UN humanitarian assessment, a ban on Liberian timber exports could result in the loss of up to 10,000 relatively well-paid jobs.²⁹ In a country that averages nine dependents for each employed person, this change could mean a loss of primary means of support for approximately 90,000 people. Timber exports also provide about 9 percent of Liberian government revenues, and they constitute the predominant commercial activity at three of the country's four ports.³⁰ A timber embargo thus could have far-reaching economic and social consequences. In a Security Council briefing on the report, representatives of Global Witness challenged the accuracy of the UN's humanitarian assessment, claiming that the figures for employment and economic impact were exaggerated.³¹ A number of Council members expressed opposition to timber sanctions, however, for political and economic reasons as well as because of humanitarian concerns, and it appeared unlikely that such measures would be adopted.

Policy Impacts?

UN sanctions have had positive impacts. RUF forces and their Liberian supporters have faced shortages of arms and money. They have shown a new readiness to accept a negotiated peace settlement. These trends became evident following the tightening of sanctions in Sierra Leone in 2000 and their imposition in Liberia in 2001. The RUF signed an unconditional cease-fire in November 2000 and affirmed this agreement in May 2001. In March and April 2001, less than a year after they mounted armed attacks against UN peacekeepers, RUF officials invited

UNAMSIL forces to begin deploying in rebel-controlled territory. An analysis in *The Economist* traced the RUF truce in part to the imposition of UN sanctions against Liberia.³²

These shifts in RUF/Liberian policy may have been partially a response to sanctions pressures, but they also resulted from changes in battlefield conditions.³³ Hundreds of troops from the United Kingdom intervened in May 2000 to help free UN peacekeepers. They remained in the country to train the armed forces of Sierra Leone, thereby increasing military pressure on the RUF. Military attacks from Guinea also played a role. Guinean forces carried out armed attacks and bombing raids against RUF and Liberian territory, ostensibly in retaliation for raids against towns and villages in Guinea. Clashes occurred in September 2000 and continued into 2001.

The political and military effects of the Guinean attacks on RUF and Liberian forces were "devastating," according to a BBC report.³⁴ One of the reasons the RUF accepted the deployment of UN peacekeepers was to obtain help in fending off further military incursions from Guinean forces. The combination of military pressure from Guinea, the presence of UK troops, the growing deployment of UNAMSIL, and the strengthening of Security Council sanctions fundamentally changed the dynamics of the struggle.

The specific role of sanctions in helping to bring about these changes cannot be determined precisely, but it is likely that the imposition of diamond sanctions and increased international attention to the role of Liberia made it more difficult for the RUF to rely on cross-border assistance from the Taylor regime. The pressures were as much psychological as economic. The tightening of sanctions, like the expansion of UNAMSIL, was a sign of increased pressure on Liberia and the RUF. The fact that sanctions were now being applied to Liberia as well as the RUF undoubtedly had a sobering impact in Monrovia. More than the actual impact of sanctions themselves, it was probably the threat of sanctions and what they implied for the future that had the greatest impact on the policy calculations of Taylor and the RUF commanders.

The Way Forward: Coercion or Persuasion?

In West Africa, as in Angola, the United Nations has gradually shifted from a more traditional stance of neutrality and the pursuit of negotiations toward a more coercive role of increasing pressure on the RUF and its Liberian patrons. The UN interagency missions to West Africa

found substantial support in the region for strengthening the UNAMSIL mandate from neutral peacekeeping to more assertive peace enforcement.³⁵ The April 2001 report from the ICG called for abandoning further negotiations with the RUF and pursuing instead a strategy of military attack and coercive sanctions to defeat the RUF. According to the report, "There should be no more negotiations with the . . . RUF other than for its complete disarmament and demobilization."³⁶ The former U.S. ambassador to Sierra Leone, John Hirsch, likewise argued that "the war should be brought to an end not by further protracted negotiations, but by RUF's surrender."³⁷

Many within the UN and in Africa have been skeptical of or opposed to a more aggressive strategy. Some UN and ECOWAS officials have continued to support a more conciliatory approach, attempting to persuade rather than coerce RUF commanders into accepting UNAMSIL deployment and adhering to the Lomé accord as a basis for political settlement. ECOWAS played a major role in the past in attempting to resolve the crisis, but its largest member, Nigeria, has been reluctant to intervene again militarily. Although ECOWAS has remained involved and its military contingents have served in UNAMSIL, the organization has remained divided between supporters of the Kabbah government (Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana) and supporters of the RUF (Liberia and Burkina Faso).

For the UN, a militarily assertive strategy in West Africa presents fundamental difficulties. The prospects of UNAMSIL or any other UN peacekeeping force mounting military enforcement efforts successfully are practically nil. As the August 2000 Brahimi Report convincingly argued, UN peacekeeping missions have been fundamentally incapable of applying sustained, effective combat pressure.³⁸ The UN has repeatedly failed in attempts to project credible force. The embarrassing debacle of RUF forces capturing UNAMSIL troops in May and June 2000 only confirmed the ineptitude of UN peacekeeping when confronted with hostile force.

In Sierra Leone, the function of military enforcement has been performed by British troops and military advisers, who arrived in June 2000 to rescue UN peacekeepers and remained to train and shape the Sierra Leone army. Unlike UN peacekeepers, British troops were more heavily armed and operated with rules of engagement that permitted the use of coercive force, which allowed the growing forces of UNAMSIL to preserve a largely neutral presence. UNAMSIL expanded into a very large force, but it functioned primarily in the traditional mold of UN peacekeeping, lightly armed and lacking robust rules of engagement.

UN peacekeepers served as tacit partners of the British troops, notwithstanding some tensions between the two forces.³⁹ British troops provided the coercive presence that convinced some RUF forces to surrender their arms and seek the protection of UN peacekeepers.

Security Council sanctions have played a key role in this increasingly assertive strategy by applying coercive pressure on both the RUF and the Liberian government. The sanctions have deprived the RUF and the Taylor government of income, arms, and travel opportunities. They have signaled international determination to isolate and pressure the RUF and the government in Monrovia. Through continuing and more vigorous efforts to enforce the sanctions, and with the continued presence of both peace enforcement and peacekeeping troops, the international community may eventually succeed in bringing peace to Sierra Leone.

Notes

1. Communiqué issued by the Joint Government of Sierra Leone/Revolutionary United Front/UNAMSIL Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 17 January 2002, <<http://www.sierra-leone.org/jointcommittee011702.html>> (25 February 2002).
2. United Nations Security Council, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Durable and Sustainable Solutions to Priority Needs and Challenges in West Africa: Report of the Inter-Agency Mission to West Africa*, S/2001/434, New York, 2 May 2001, par. 85.
3. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy*, Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001, 3.
4. United Nations Security Council, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach*, S/2001/434, par. 13.
5. *Ibid.*
6. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone*, ii.
7. *Ibid.*
8. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000)*, S/RES/1306, New York, 5 July 2000.
9. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000)*, Paragraph 19, in *Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, New York, 20 December 2000.
10. *Ibid.*, par. 17.
11. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security* (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000), 47.
12. *Ibid.*, 48.
13. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000)*, Paragraph 19, in *Relation to Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1195, par. 20.
14. *Ibid.*, par. 2.

15. *Ibid.*, par. 23.
16. *Ibid.*, par. 8.
17. *Ibid.*, par. 39.
18. As reported in United Nations Security Council, *First Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) Regarding Liberia*, S/2001/424, New York, 30 April 2001, par. 37.
19. *Ibid.*, par. 33.
20. *Ibid.*, par. 7.
21. United Nations Security Council, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach*, S/2001/434, par. 114.
22. United Nations Security Council, *Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2000/1199, New York, 15 December 2000, par. 55.
23. *The Economist* reported "some 43,000" killed in Sierra Leone in the past ten years. See "Sierra Leone: The Spreading Battleground," *The Economist*, 7 April 2001. According to a 1999 report by Human Rights Watch, between 50,000 and 75,000 died from 1991 to 1999. See Human Rights Watch, *Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone* (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1999), 1.
24. U.S. Department of State, "Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 January 1998).
25. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 13(a) of Resolution 1343 (2001) Concerning Liberia*, S/2001/939, New York, 5 October 2001, par. 19.
26. "Sierra Leone: The Spreading Battleground," 48.
27. Norimitsu Onishi, "Guinea in Crisis as Area's Refugees Pour In," *New York Times*, 24 February 2001, A1.
28. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 21 January–12 February 1998*, 98/0016, New York, 17 February 1998.
29. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 13(a), S/2001/939*, par. 34.
30. *Ibid.*, pars. 36, 38.
31. Global Witness, "The Real Price of Sanctions on Timber," 17 October 2001, supplement to the report, *Taylor-Made: The Pivotal Role of Liberia's Forests and Flag of Convenience in Regional Conflict*, Global Witness, London, September 2001, <www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/liberia/taylor-made2.pdf> (25 October 2001).
32. "Sierra Leone: The Spreading Battleground," 48.
33. Lansana Gberie, "Analysis: Rebels Without a Future," *BBC Online*, 21 May 2001, <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1343000/1343113.htm> (9 September 2001).
34. *Ibid.*
35. United Nations Security Council, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach*, S/2001/434, par. 31.
36. International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone*, ii.
37. John L. Hirsch, "War in Sierra Leone," *Survival* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 145–162.
38. Lakhdar Brahimi et al., *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Identical Letters Dated 21 August*

2000 from the S-G to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York, 21 August 2000 (also known as the "Brahimi Report").

39. These observations are based on personal observation in Sierra Leone during the summer of 2001 by William Reno; personal communication from William Reno, October 2001.